Aitihasik Lekh Sangraha Vol 8
Translation of the author's summary of the Maratha-Mysore war of 1785-87 from Volume 8.
Campaign against Tipu
After the meeting of the Nizam and Nana Fadnavis at Yadgir, they decided to launch a campaign against Tipu in the following year, this has been described in the previous chapter. When Tipu learnt of the Nizam and the Peshwa planning a campaign against him, he was alarmed. He resolved to strike first before their armies were ready. The previous year, Tipu had taken prisoner an entire English force and dictated terms to the English for peace. Despite the peace treaty, he continued to hold prisoner thousands of English sepoys. As a result, Tipu was in high spirits. He considered himself more than capable of dealing with the joint army of the Nizam and Peshwa.
On the condition that he will aid them in the war with English and remit 6 lakh Rupees per year, Tipu was ceded the lands beyond the Tungabhadra by Nana Fadnavis. Two small states included in these lands were Nargund and Kittur. These were retained in the Peshwa’s rule. However, their dues to Pune were to be collected by Hyder and remitted on their behalf to Pune. Tipu was resolved to annex both these territories, especially Nargund by assault. He nursed special hatred for the Bhaves of Nargund as they were close to the Patwardhans. The Bhaves’ karbhari (general) Kalopant Pethe was a brave and capable man. Considering the Peshwa’s armies to be capable of defending him, he did not pay heed to Tipu’s demands. Previously, Tipu had attacked and been repulsed twice. Kalopant also posted spies in Tipu’s court who would provide intel to Pune.
Tipu knew that if Pune learns of the expedition to Nargund in advance, they will send a relief army to its aid, making its capture impossible. The scheme he devised to get around this shows his treacherous and cunning nature. He sent an envoy to Pune for negotiations but immediately also dispatched an army against Nargund. The Peshwa had complaints about unpaid arrears of tribute for the past 2 years. For discussing this, Tipu claimed to have sent this envoy. But the true aim was that when Nana recieves news of Nargund being sieged, the envoy will be able to lie to him that the army was only there to collect tribute. He will lie further that he does not intend to capture the place or seek any hostilities with the Peshwa. He should say that he is there to make a settlement for the tribute and maintain friendship.
The vakil Tipu sent for this mission to Pune did his job too well! And Nana Fadnavis outdid him in pretending that he believed what he said. With the mediation of Laxmanrao Raste, the vakil had presented a number of points for consideration, when 10 thousand cavalry, 15 thousand drilled infantry, 15 cannons and 2 mortars laid siege to Nargund. Tipu’s son in law Burhanuddin was the main commander of this army. At the same time, Tipu sent messengers to Shindes of Torgal, Desais of Kittur, and Karvir Maharaj demanding tribute and submission or they will face his army. When Parshuram Bhau got word of the siege of Nargund, he immediately sent word to Nana recommending the dispatch of a relief army that would raise the siege. But, pretending to pay heed to what Tipu’s envoy was saying, Nana and Haripant Phadke did not pay heed to what Bhau said. They wanted to avoid a war with Tipu while they were unprepared in the current year. Tipu’s treacherous nature was known well to the Patwardhans and even more to the Nargund garrison. Kaloji Pant knew that an army this large, commanded by someone of importance as Burhanuddin would not leave unless they had taken his fort. But he did not lose heart. He was hopeful that a relief army would arrive from Pune. So rejecting any terms, he prepared for fighting. The fighting lasted for 7 months from January to July 1785. Kalopant had 2000 cavalry, 2000 infantry and some cannons. They were defeated in the outworks and pushed into the fort over time. Once he led a sortie personally on the enemy’s batteries and destroyed it, slaying 100-200. Burhanuddin was angry at this and built more batteries, launching a massive bombardment on the market of the town. Despite this, the garrison repelled them. But the invaders continued to occupy a part of the market, from where they could not be dislodged. On February 12, after anoter attack, they seized the market completely, and the garrison had to abandon it and withdraw to the fort inside. The cavalry also withdrew to the fort, along with many civilians. There were about 4 thousand men capable of fighting in the fort. There was enough shot and powder to last for a few months. The enemy began a heavy bombardment and continued to advance their batteries closer. Kalopant fought with resolve and repulsed all attacks.
When news arrived of the investment of Nargund and capture of the marketplace, it became impossible for Nana to pretend that he was convinced nothing was happening. The vakil was still saying “ Please be at ease, I will write and get the siege lifted.” Ignoring his words, 5000 cavalry was immediately dispatched with Ganeshpant Behre to aid Parshuram Bhau, and wrote a letter to Bhau saying “You should march with this force and yours to raise the siege of Nargund. The vakil is saying he will get the siege raised in one month. But if the fort falls in the meantime then what will we do? Without waiting for anything, you must march immediately. In case the siege is raised, we have no further cause for hostilities, and do not ravage his lands.”
Parshuram Bhau was angry at Nana for the delay shown in responding to the crisis. But after he received the letter from Nana, he was pacified and immediately organized three groups to march. The first had 5000 cavalry, to be commanded by Janoba subhedar, and under him was Trimbakrao Retrekar. This force was tasked to march to Manoli and watch the mountain pass. The second force was 10,000 cavalry commanded by Raghunath Kurundvadkar and assisted by Ganeshpant Behre, Raste, Venkatrao Ghorpade Sondurkar. They were to march to Ramdurg. From the pass there, march to Nargund and raise the siege. If the enemy resists, they were to engage them in battle. But it was of utmost importance. After sending these two groups, Parshuram Bhau himself went to Mudhol with 7000 cavalry to send reinforcements to either force as he saw fit.
Burhanuddin got word that the Marathi force is marching on him. He decided to make utmost exertions to capture the fort before they arrived. Seeing that the artillery was making no impression on the fort, he decided to launch a direct assault and ordered the sepoys ahead. Under heavy fire they reached the base of the bastions. The garrison attacked them with musketry and stones, killing almost 100. The remaining men panicked and fled. All this while, the work of digging trenches and batteries closer to the walls continued day and night, eventually reaching close to the bastions. Here it came to a halt, as the ground was hard rock. After waiting for a few days to restore their morale, he attempted a second larger attack on the walls by escalade. This time he lost almost a thousand men dead and 2 thousand more wounded from the garrison’s fire. This time his men’s morale collapsed and they abandoned the batteries. Elated by their performance, the garrison swept down from the bastions and attacked the remaining men in their trenches and batteries, slaying even more, and set fire to the guns and ammo.
While this was the situation, Kuruvandkar, Raste, Behere and others reached Ramdurg. Crossing the pass, they halted within 2 kos from Nargund. Seeing this, the garrison cheered and fired some cannons in celebration. It was impossible to maintain the siege while facing this external army, so Burhanuddin was forced to lift the siege. He sent the large siege cannons to Dharwar. With the rest of his army he marched to river Bonihal and entrenched himself, waiting for reinforcements from Shrirangapattanam.
Col. Wilkis writes that at this time, Tipu’s army withdrew due to lack of water, but we have given the true reason above. At this time, the claim that Tipu’s sardars insulted the Marathi sardars and a small skirmish following it are also false. In this campaign, the Marathi force did not advance to attack. This is because Nana had issued strict orders not to engage unless fired upon. “We wish to keep good terms with Rao Pantpradhan so we have ordered to raise the siege of Nargund” - such a letter was received by Tipu’s vakil. But Parshuram Bhau was not happy with the state of affairs. He demanded that Burhanuddin should release any civilians he has taken captive, vacate any outposts he has occupied around Nargund, and withdraw with all his force to beyond the Tungabhadra. Only if all three demands are acceded to, then they can be trusted. Nana was of the opinion that “the enemy’s envoy is here to negotiate the tribute. If he has lifted the siege then why should we create more problems? As the end of the year is approaching and we are not prepared, it is better not to start a battle at this time. If the envoy is negotiating in a straightforward manner, so should we.” Nana also wrote to the Nizam regarding this matter, and he replied that “it is better if war can be avoided. But if it becomes unavoidable, then we must face it. Either way we are with you. A force of 10 thousand cavalry with Kay-ul-mulk is being sent to your aid to Surapur. If needed, Bhau should summon him.” In summary, the Nizam was vacillating just like Nana. The English envoy at the nizam’s court was of the opinion “if the Nizam and the Peshwa are launching an expedition against Tipu, the company may be interested in contributing.” But since the English had signed a peace with Tipu previously without consulting the others, they were not too keen on getting the Company involved.
In the end, Nana and Haripant decided to avoid any decisive fighting for the year, and finally wrote to Bhau “The enemy has raised the siege of Nargund. You have accomplished what you set out to do. After that, without following the enemy, your forces should retire to Ramdurg and camp there. If the enemy advances on you, withdraw but do not escalate. The envoy here has almost negotiated a settlement although I am not sure of his intentions. So Kalopant, Venkatrao and any other nobles whose families are Nargund, should be brought back with you. Kalopant fought very bravely. He should not remain there nor should he keep any family members there. Only one capable sardar and 2 thousand men should remain.
Bhau, who had a strong dislike to Tipu was a brave and capable general. When repeated letters like this began arriving, he was greatly angered. He replied “Why is the karbhari (general) so afraid of Tipu? What does Tipu have to do with the greatness of our state? We have 20 thousand cavalry, 4000 infantry, as well as artillery ready. We are capable of charging Burhanuddin’s sepoys and destroying them, seizing his artillery and driving him beyond the Tungabhadra. Despite this, the karbhari is telling us to withdraw even if the enemy attacks us instead of fighting. Then what can I do? If a peace treaty has been settled, then why does he want us to evacuate the family of Kalopant and the rest? Since the government is ordering us so, it is our duty to withdraw. But if we continue on this path, I will lose faith in the government’s intentions, and it will be a difficult task for the karbhari. This is something he should think about.”
Lots of civilians and animals alike had crowded into the fort, which were evacuated by Bhau. Despite his pleas, Kalopant refused to vacate the fort and send his family away. Fate willed his mind in this manner. Since letters are arriving from Pune that a peace has been negotiated, the enemy wont come this way again - either because of such a thought or because he feared that the garrison will surrender quickly without him, Kalopant assumed there will be a campaign against the enemy after the rains, and he planned to hold the fort until then. How this decision sealed his fate we will see ahead.
To reinforce Burhanuddin, Tipu sent a second army. Now he had 30 thousand sepoys, 10 thousand cavalry, and 30 cannons. Now confident that he had enough men to face Bhau, he began to march straight and arrived near Ramdurg’s valley. Sealing the passes, he sent one detachment to Ramdurg. With the remaining army he laid siege to Nargund yet again. At the mountain pass, Kuruvandkar, Raste, Behere etc did not have the numbers to face Burhanuddin, so they began a fighting retreat. Everyday there would be skirmishing and both sides lost some men. On one day the Maratha cavalry destroyed a small camp and drove away their cavalry, capturing 100 horses. But it remained small skirmishes. Fighting rearguard actions, they finally reached the bank of the river Krishna. Nana Fadnavis had not made arrangements to supply coin and supplies for this army from Pune. Burhanuddin’s force was not capable of launching an invasion of Swarajya’s territory proper, but when news arrived in Pune of Burhanuddin crossing Ramdurg, Manoli, Bannur and captured these outposts, Nana dispatched 2000 sepoys, 10,000 cavalry and some cannons to Bhau’s aid. But now there was no use of this haste. Due to rains, the roads had closed. The rivers flooded. The time to move armies had passed. That is why Parshuram Bhau was forced to send his gathered men back to their quarters. Raste, Behere and other sardars did not return to Pune. Instead they remained in camp on the Krishna riverbank. The cannons bombarding Nargund could be heard as far away as Gokak. But the time for decisive action was gone. Now there was no force capable of resisting.
Parshuram Bhau was of the opinion that even though the Ramdurg pass was sealed, there were other passes through which he could march and fall on the enemy’s rear. If Nana had accepted these proposals, Bhau would have forced Burhanuddin to vacate the Ramdurg encampment and withdraw. He would not have thought of marching to Nargund again. But Nana feared that Tipu will declare war as this would involve Maratha troops marching into Tipu’s territory. In the end, Tipu did what he meant to do all along. The loss of prestige taken by Marathi state was dealt anyway, but Tipu also got an opportunity to insult them further. Previously, Hyder Ali had taken the fort of Gooty and imprisoned Murrarao Ghorpade and his family, and at the battle of Saunshi, he had defeated the Marathi army and taken Pandurangrao Patwardhan and Shivrav Ghorpade prisoners. This stung the Pune darbar, but caught up in internal matters they had been unable to take their revenge - so we can say. But in this Nargund episode, if Nana had taken it seriously, it would have avoided this third embarassment - in our opinion. Anyway. Now what is left to narrate is the tale of the Nardung garrison, which is a moving story.
We have narrated earlier how Burhanuddin laid siege to the fort again in May. Despite repeated attacks, he was unable to make any breach, while he kept taking heavy losses every time. So he decided to see the result after heavy bombardment. Just then news arrived that “Burhanuddin has prepared a wax model of the fort and sent it to Shrirangapattanam. Seeing it, Tipu commanded that at the spot labelled Pusati, fire one lakh cannonballs at the fort. If that does not work then we will see what to do. To execute this, the attackers are producing 1000-2000 cannonballs per day outside the fort.” Although these were rumours floating in to the garrison, it is true that the fort was being bombarded very heavily. Despite this, Tipu’s golandaz (artillerymen) proved unable to make any breach in the fort. Eventually Burhanuddin decided to starve out the garrison and in this he met with success. Badami’s killedar Ghulam Haider who was known to Kalopant was sent to him with a message “You have fought valiantly. Now why are you enduring suffering? You should descend from the fort and hand it over to us. You will be escorted safely outside our lands without any harm.” At the time, Kalopant rejected the offer. But at the end of July such a situation came to pass that despite all his bravery he was forced to surrender. In that year, the rains were absent around Nargund. As a result it became easy for the attackers to continue their siege, and despite the rainy season, the garrison had a shortage of water. Then with the mediation of the Kazi of Torgal, they came to an arrangement that Burhanuddin will permit them to go where they please if they vacate the fort. He promised not to harm them or the families of the garrison or their property. After this arrangement, Kalopant, Venkatrao and their families descended the fort. But Burhanuddin treacherously arrested them. How this happened will be better understood from reading the newsletters from the time.
[quoted passages]
In this manner, Kalopant, Venkatrao and their families were put in chains and sent to Shrirangapattanam. They were moved in small groups to avoid the risk of any rebellion or escape. Previously, when Murrarrao Ghorpade was taken prisoner treacherously, a similar method had to be followed.
Tipu’s campaign against Kittur
September 1785 to March 1786
In August 1785, after the capture of Nargund, Burhanuddin sent his army to capture Kittur. In this army, to help him, were Said Gaffar and Sheikh Ansar as sardars. More reinforcements kept arriving from Shrirangapattanam. Finally he had 15,000 sepoys, 7-8 thousand Karnataki infantry, 8000 cavalry and 40 siege cannons.
When this force arrived in the vicinty of Kittur, its sardar Desai thought that if Nargund’s killedar who fought so bravely and even received reinforcements had to end up a prisoner, we will end up in the same fashion if we resist. So he decided to surrender and submit right away. Thinking thus, he went and met the sultan’s army. But to be honourable to the surrendering force was never in Tipu’s code of conduct. Along with his family and military chief Gurudaspant, everyone was arrested and confined, and Kittur and its dependencies were annexed.
Once this was done, the army began to march towards the Peshwa’s lands. In the months of November and December, they captured outposts like Dodwad, Khanapur, Sampgaon, Baswant, Bagewadi etc. At the time, the Desai at Jamboti was quite strong. For his reduction, 5-7 thousand sepoys, 4 cannons marched to Jamboti and laid siege. For a week the garrison resisted. Eventually, the Desai abandoned the post at night and escaped. Around this time the enemy also captured the outpost at Nesar.
The outpost at Sada is at the old borders of Sawantwadi. If he marched on them, the Sadekars would combine their forces with the Portuguese at Goa and the Desais of Sawantwadi -such was the news. But ultimately no assistance was provided so this outpost also fell. Towards the end of December the enemy captured Hoskote and Pacchapur. In summary, other than Belgaum the Peshwa had no major fort left in the region. Near the fort was the Patwardhans’ province of Shahpur. Since the fort was nearby it was saved.
News of the enemy pillaging the land around Belgaum began to arrive at Pune. In January 1786 Nana Fadnavis departed with the army to meet the Nizam. When it became unavoidable to resist the damage being done to Belgaum, Nana dispatched some soldiers from Tukoji Holkar’s regiments to Kittur. Ganeshpant Behere who was encamped on the Krishna river for some time also mobilized his men and marched with 10 thousand cavalry to Yeur-Manjri. At this time, the Desai of Sade gathered some 2000 men and “made a surprise attack on Sade outpost and slew 150 men and even their families. The rest of the garrison fled and the outpost was recovered. There were 5 cannons in the outpost and shot and powder. Food and other items that had been replenished were also secured. Rajashri Nilkanth Gowda Sardesai Khanapur’s son Venkatrao did all this.”
A man named Venkatranga had negotiated with Tipu that he would secure 5 lakhs in tribute from Kittur and arrived in the vicinity from Shrirangapattanam. Despite extorting two or three times that amount, his greed was not satisfied. He dug up the mansions and storage and confiscated any coin, jewelry etc belonging to the wealthy. Anyone of wealth in the province was arrested and ransomed. Not only did he extract all the regular taxes from the peasants, but on top he added a tax called umbarpatti and took an extra 3 Rupees from each family. While this was being done by the tax collector, the army wasn’t idle either. They were gathering all the grain and supplies in the province and dispatched it to Dharwar. They reduced the province to dire straits after its capture - of which one incident was the worst. That incident is- any young women or men were made prisoners and taken away. The women were sent to harems of Tipu or his sardars. The men were forcibly converted and forced into service. Some 5 to 8 battalions of soldiers were formed of such men. Regarding this, the newsletters in Kannada are surprising.
[quoted passages]
When they got news of the approach of Holkars, Beheres, they sent their camp followers and siege artillery to Dharwad and Misrikote. The army was divided into two divisions and remained deployed near Kittur and Khanapur. When the raiders of the Kittur contingent marched to Hukkeri and Gokak, the peasants in the region fled to Miraj. Just then, learning of the Maratha army closing in, they withdrew, combined their forces and deployed near Kittur. But they did not intend to fight hard. If engaged, they were planning to withdraw into the dense forest, to Dharwad and then Murgod. But to their surprise, when they got reports that the Maratha army did not go to Kittur but to Dharwad, they kept only 5000 cavalry at Kittur and the rest withdrew to Hubli and camped below the fort.
Despite his surrender, the Kittur’s Desai gained nothing from it. Instead his entire province was ravaged as described above, and he ended up in chains in Shrirangapattanam.
First expedition against Tipu
September 1785 to April 1787
In 1785, Tipu sent an army to capture Nargund and Kittur, two small states that were to be defended by the Peshwa. But since the Marathas and the Nizam were unprepared for war in that year, both Nizam Ali and Nana Fadnavis preferred to not escalate into war and try and continue negotiations. But disregarding their hand of friendship, Tipu seized both provinces and annexed them. Not only this, but he also captured the province between the two rivers Gatprabha and Malprabha near Belgav and was planning to march on Miraj. This has been narrated in the previous two chapters. As a result, since Tipu initiated the war, it was left to Nana Fadnavis and Nizam to finish it as they saw fit.
As soon as the fort of Nargund was lost, Nana Fadnavis began mobilizing for war in August 1785. Mudhoji Bhonsle of Nagpur had arrived in Pune at this time. In the recently concluded Anglo-Maratha war, the Bhonsles did not help the Pune darbar but leaned towards the English, hence Nana Fadnavis was angry at Bhonsles. With the intention of restoring good ties and to secure the title of Senasahebsubha for his son from the Peshwa, Mudhoji Bhonsle came to Pune. After much discussion, it was decided that past grievances should be forgotten, and if there was a war in the future between the Marathas and English, the Bhonsles would without question side with Pune. Nana Fadnavis agreed that Mudhoji’s son Raghuji would be granted the Senasahebsubha title again. Since his health was not in good spirits, Mudhoji left behind his son Manyaba with 2000 horse and left for Nagpur to mobilize the army and return.
[ Part about festivals and misc is skipped]
To chalk out the campaign against Tipu, Nana Fadnavis had summoned Parshuram Bhau, Gangadharrao and Raghunathrao Patwardhan to Pune. But Parshuram Bhau replied that the previous year, Nana left him in the lurch and forced him to remain idle despite his sound advice, and that he has no interest in giving any counsel. Nana should decide the course of action and send him the orders. He will not go to Pune.
Despite the unhappiness expressed by the Patwardhans, Nana had to continue mobilizing the army. Towards the end of Shravan, Haripant Phadke arrived in the camp tents. Letters had been sent out to the shiledars and sardars to assemble for the march. But until the end of the Karthik month, the army had not begun its march. On December 12, Nana Fadnavis himself arrived in the camp. Tukoji Holkar was already at Pune. Together with Haripant, they marched via Baramati to Pandharpur. After 4-5 days, Nana Fadnavis marched on the same route after them. Letters were received about Bhonsles having completed their preparations and marching from Gavilgad. Further away the Nizam was also ready. With slow marches, the Nizam’s troops were marching towards Yadgir.
[ some text about marriages in Haripant Phadke’s family skipped]
When the army reached Pandharpur, Parshurambhau arrived from Tasgaon, and Raghunathrao from Kurundvada joined with their regiments. Mudhoji Bhonsle arrived from Nagpur. Together they marched to join the Nizam. In this army, the Peshwa’s huzurat was commanded by Haripant Phadke and Bajipant Anna. In addition, Patwardhan, Bhonsle, Holkar and other sardars were also present with their soldiers. Ganeshpant Behre was camped in southern districts since the previous year near Krishna river. Since Burhanuddin had 25 thousand sepoys and 25 cannons at Kittur, Nana concluded that Behere alone would not be able to hold on his own against him, and detached Holkars to join him, along with 5000 from the Peshwa’s cavalry.
[False rumours of Tipu’s death skipped]
The Nizam’s army had reached and made camp at Yadgir before the Maratha army arrived. Together the camps spread out over a distance of 10-15 kos. As the old subhedar of the 6 subahs of the Deccan, it need not be mentioned that his camp was a grand spectacle. Equally grand and ponderous was the camp of the Peshwa’s karbhari. Thus it would take a long time for talks. A month and a half passed in deliberations.
Nana Fadnavis did not have any inclination to stay with the army till the conclusion of the campaign against Tipu. His aim was to set the campaign on its course and return to Pune as soon as possible. This is because even though the treacherous Dadasaheb (Raghunathrao) had passed away, his wife Anandibai was still around. She had two sons BajiraoII and Chimnaji. Raghunathrao’s supporters were still embedded, and there was always a persistent threat to the life of Sawai Madhavrao. Nana endeavored to leave the burden of the campaign to Haripant and Nizam Ali and return quickly. But seeing Nana’s intention to withdraw, Nizam Ali also declined to accompany the army. Seeing that both of them are leaving, Mudhoji also announced his intention to return to Nagpur. Parshuram Bhau had anyway declared he was not going to accompany the army. This is because the new army he was to raise for this expedition was still being deliberated and it did not seem like any conclusion would be made. Regarding this, the letters of the time are quite entertaining. Patwardhans’ vakil Vaddekar writes on 8 March in a letter “We met Nawab Nizam Ali and discussions are on. Eventually Nana said that he was going to Pune and requested the Nizam and Tatya (Haripant) to proceed. To this, the Nawab replied that since Nana is leaving, so will he. Good relations between us for 40 years have been spoilt due to you. If you are leaving, what is the use of our presence? We are leaving.” Deliberating this took so long. In the end, due to fear that it will spoil diplomatic ties and fail the campaign, Nana decided to stay. From here, they will march to the Krishna river. The territory beyond it will be partitioned evenly between the two powers - as per the decided arranagement. Bhausaheb has not decided anything yet. (Patwardhans?). We have not yet met the Nizam’s sardars. But we met Nana and Tatya. Similarly, we met the Bhonsles in their tents. The Nawab once came to the Peshwas’ tent and was gifted a robe and jewels worth 10,000 rupees. That Tipu is alive (and rumours of death are false) is news arriving from Adoni.
[more quoted letters in a similar vein skipped]
“ Similar to this many discussions went on. Nothing was finalized. Today we marched 5 kos. In a couple of days something will be decided, then I will write more. Some of the Nawab’s troops and some soldiers of Rajashri Bajipant Joshi were sent to Kanakgiri. Tipu has made 2 to 4 days of marches towards us from Shrirangapattanam. He has 50-60 thousand foot, 15-16 thousand cavalry, 200 cannons according to sources. But nothing is confirmed yet.”
To reconcile Haripant and Parshuram Bhau who were both upset with Nana, the Nizam’s karbhari Main-ud-daula mentioned is the same who would prove to be the cause of the war of Kharda later, Mushir-ul-mulk!
Because of the Nizam’s insistence that he would continue only if Nana remained with the army, he dropped his plan to return to Pune. But the Nizam was even more anxious than Nana to return. After deliberations, both decided to capture Badami first and marched to it. Then Nizam Ali announced on his own, his intention to depart soon. Nana and Haripant insisted that he should stay but he would not listen. Leaving an army of 25-30 thousand with his sardarTaivar-jung under the command of Haripant, the Nizam departed for Bhagnagar.
For this campaign against Tipu, Nana and Mahadji had already written to Calcutta to Lotsaheb(?) to invite the English. He replied that the English had just concluded peace with him, and it would sully their reputation to go to war openly so soon without a strong cause. So for this, they offered to send 5 battalions but they would stay within the borders of Maratha or Nizam’s lands and fight defensively, and avoid crossing over into Tipu’s border. But this kind of help was not in the interest of either Nizam or the Marathas. This discussion was mainly to decieve Tipu and to prevent the English from joining forces with him - hence this exchange of letters continued for months. When a foreign state’s ambassador is posted, he usually stays in that state’s capital. They cannot go around on campaigns of the army of that state. Regardless, Nana had taken along the English envoy with their army to Badami. His intention was to show to Tipu’s spies that he was on very good terms with the English. But Tipu saw through it.
In this province, the fort of Badami was renowned for its strength. In addition, Tipu had spent a large sum strengthening it further. With the mediation of the Nargundkars, the sardar Ghulam Haider who betrayed and captured the fort was posted as its commander along with a sizeable force. On 1st May, 1786, the Marathi army began to dig trenches and lay siege. Despite the efforts of the garrison, each day the trenches got closer. Parshuram Bhau’s trench and batteries were the furthest ahead, and he used to inspect it daily. The progress was slow. It was thought that the fort would take too long to fall by siege, and in the meantime Tipu would arrive with a large army, so it is better to attack. The ladders were prepared for escalade.
Even before the siege of Badami, Bajipant Anna was sent to the Tungabhadra, as mentioned earlier. With long marches, Bajipant marched to Kanakgiri. He had planned to seize Tipu’s financers. But they got word of his arrival and they escaped. Not just this, but the peasants in Kanakgiri and Anagundi had fled to Tipu’s lands along with their possessions and animals. Bajipant sacked Handmasagar’s marketplace, and captured Kachengund outpost, wiping out Tipu’s men posted there. Just then he got a letter from Nana ordering him to return. So he returned to Badami. The sardar Raste in the army of the Beheres was also summoned to Badami.
After Nizam Ali’s departure Nana wanted to leave but the sardars prevailed in convincing him to stay until the fort was captured. On 20 May, the three forces, Peshwa, Bhonsles and Nizam all launched a simultaneously and captured the fort. A bureaucrat named Nilkanth Ponkshe has given an account of the attack. He refers to Parshuram Bhau as Yajman Swami. The account is as follows-
“Shrimant Nana began to indicate he wants to leave for Pune. Everyone insisted that he should stay until the fort is captured. Even so, he was very insistent on leaving. For 2-3 days there was much confusion. Then Yajman Swami asked Shrimant Appasaheb to exit the camp at a suitable muhurat, but not proceed nor return. It was also decided to assault the fort. The ladders and other material was already gathered. On ch21 Rajjab, Mandvar, at sunrise, the attack was launched. To the west of the fort was one major battery. Here and near the main gate the defenders had two mines. Both were ignited. A large number of our men were killed in the blast. Around 150 people were killed. Another 200-250 wounded. Mortally wounded 15. The main gate’s breach was captured by Yajman Swami’s men immediately. He was right behind them. There was a mansion in the town outside the fort that was also attacked at the same time. Parshuram Bhau secured his position at the gate, then retired. The garrison opened talks, and offered to surrender if they were allowed to leave unharmed. The government’s cannons stopped bombardment. But the garrison’s men did not descend. Parshuram Bhau sent word to Haripant that “he was unhappy with the terms offered, and cannonfire should resume. If they want to surrender, they will. The terms were offered yesterday but they have still not exited. The commander Ghulam Haider is treacherous and should be arrested, not let go. As well as anyone related to the treachery. The rest should be released.” Haripant said “he had already accepted the garrison’s surrender and it would be dishonourable to violate it, and that he was confident they would exit the fort soon. The fort’s water is also about to run out. There are too many animals inside. Many of the good fighters are already slain. Civilians have also died. The government has set up checkpoints. The ones surrendering are released only after identification. Buried treasure was shown to us by local priest. They were recovered and taken posession of. More are being interrogated. Any brahmins (priests) in the town have already exited and surrendered to the governement.”
Govind Sakhdev also writes an account “In front of the main gate, we had a battery. They had buried a large mine in the trench below it. As soon as we got close, they ignited the mine. There was a huge explosion. At that time, Shrimant Rajashri’s Shiledars, Rohillas and Brahmins together lost around 100 men killed. The men of the huzurat had attacked as well, they also took casualties. They lost around 60 men. The casualties were not too severe. In total, counting the Bhonsles, Huzurat and Nawab and Bhau, total 800 were killed. The defenders lost around 600. The moat is very deep and wide, the walls are very strong, thus the fort is very strong. But by the Shrimant’s fortune it was captured.”
Thus after the capture of Badami, Nana Fadnavis departed for Pune. Along with him, Parshuram Bhau left for Tasgaon. Right from the start, Parshuram Bhau’s heart was not in the campaign. In the previous year, Nana had ordered Bhau to raise a large army and at the last moment asked him to withdraw. This was greatly bothering Bhau. There were regular arguments between the two about Bhau raising a new army for this campaign. As Nana and Haripant did not agree with him, he was upset. Regardless, he did the best he could so as to discharge his duties as a general honourably in the siege of Badami. This has already been described above. When Nana began to depart, he asked, “what is the point of my staying with the army? I should go home for my son’s thread ceremony. My forces are already with the army. I am appointing Raghunath Kuruvandkar in command in my absence. He will do as commanded by Haripant. If I had a new army then it would have been essential for me to stay. If that has not come to pass, then why should I stay?” To this, Haripant and Nana insisted that without him, the army’s morale would drop, and they valued his counsel in planning greatly. Finally he was convinced to go home and return to the army after his son’s thread ceremony. But Bhau’s real intention was to follow the news of the campaign from a distance.
When Nana and Bhau left, Mudhoji of course soon followed. Bhonsles being one of the great houses of the Maratha nobility, could not serve under any other sardar except the Peshwa. If the Nizam Ali had stayed it was a different matter. Instead of the Peshwa, his army chief Haripant would be the commander, so Mudhoji deputed Manyaba Bapu his army chief in his place and retired. Thus he informed Nana. Since he was not staying himself, he could not insist Mudhoji to stay. If he was asked to stay, then it would have meant handing over command to him as the seniormost sardar. Thus he had to accept Mudhoji’s departure. By slow marches, via Pandharpur, he left for Pune and then Nagpur.
[Few paragraphs about Nana’s halts for feasts with sardars is skipped]
In the Kittur province, Nana had already dispatched Holkars to reinforce Ganeshpant Behre as written earlier. The movements of Holkars and Beheres will be described in brief before returning to the main army’s maneouvers. After the two sardars combined, they remained in camp at Vakund for a long time. Except Kittur, all other outposts around it were taken over swiftly either by bribery or treachery. Not only that, but they even let it be known that they would soon invest Kittur. Alarmed at this, Burhanuddin had garrisoned Kittur with 3000 drilled infantry and artillery, along with sizeable stocks of grain and powder, shot. He moved his army to a mountainous terrain near Kittur where dense forest covered his flanks and waited for the Maratha army to arrive and lay siege to it. (Hoping to trap it between the fort and his army.)
But Holkars and Beheres never intended to lay siege to Kittur! Their attention was firmly on Savnur. Its Nawab was being asked to pay tribute by Tipu. But the Savnur nawab was warned by Holkars “If you do so, you will fall out of good ties with the Peshwe government. If Tipu invades, we will defend you. You should not pay him tribute.”
The nawab did not have a good estimate of Tipu anyway. Seeing that he is evading tribute, Tipu gave his moneylender Raghavendra Naik a force and dispatched it to Savnur to collect it. This moneylender was known to have been very rich. When news of his arrival at Savnur was received, Holkars marched 40 kos overnight to Savnur. But before their arrival, Raghavendra had received word of it 4 ghatikas earlier. With haste, he fled beyond the Tungabhadra. Although he was not caught, 4-5 other moneylenders from Tipu were taken prisoner and ransomed for a high sum. To protect Savnur, Ganeshpant was left with 15000 cavalry. Holkars moved with the rest to dislodge Tipu’s tax collector who had occupied the outpost of Lakshi-meshwar of the Patwardhans. On the way, to establish an outpost at Dharwar, Bapu Holkar and his diwan Parshurampant were detached with 10,000 cavalry and with the remaining 15,000 cavalry, he returned near Kittur.
Due to the presence of the armies of Behere and Bapu Holkar, Tipu’s outposts in Lakshimeshwar province - Saunshi, Malgund, Gadag, Tadas, Behatti, Navalgund were all captured. Sirhatti, Thelvanti, Shrimantgad, Vadhatti, Balehasur, were still in Tipu’s possession, and efforts were underway to capture them. The Desai of Hubli, Kanchan Gowda sent word to Bapu Holkar at Behatti, offering to hand over the two outposts that he had- new and old Hubali to his army if they march. On receipt of this offer, Bapu Holkar and Parshurampant marched to Hubali. To help them, Ganeshpant sent his relative Mahadjipant along with some cavalry. As promised, Kanchan Gowda handed them possession of old and new Hubali. Just as he was about to hand over New Hubali, this news reached Tipu’s killedar of Dharwar. Kanchan Gowda’s son had been left as hostage in the fort. The killedar tied him up and threatened to blow him up from a cannon if the Desai surrendered old Hubali to the Marathas. Fearing for his son’s life, he became evasive about surrendering old Hubali. But the cannons that were brought with the Marathas now opened fire. Due to this checkmate at Hubali, Burhanuddin, who was opposing Holkar, marched away to Kalghat. At night, he gathered his sepoys and attempted to make a night attack on Bapu Holkar. But they got informed of this from their spies, so they raised the siege and retired to Behatti. Tukoji Holkar had kept a close watch on Burhanuddin’s movements anyway. When he got news of his movements, he also marched from Vakund to Behatti and taking some forces there, reinvested Hubali. These events happened from March to June (1786).
When Badami was besieged, the garrison thought Tipu will march to their aid, and accordingly, news of his arrival at Vadaru beyond the Tungabhadra was received. This is precisely why the Marathas made haste to capture the fort before he gets close, as described earlier. At this time, Tipu realized he would not be able to reinforce Badami in time and returned south. Before returning, he sent a vakil to the Bhonsles to open negotiations with all 3. When Mudhoji halted at Pune, long discussions happened with the mediation of the Bhonsles. But no common ground could be found.
Once Badami was captured, Haripant was free to plan the rest of the campaign ahead. In his command, Patwardhans, Rastes, Akkalkotkars’s regiments and the huzurat together totalled around 40-50 thousand cavalry. In addition, Manyaba Bhonsles of Nagpur had 10,000. In addition, Tahavar Jung of Nizam Ali had 25,000. The Mughal’s army had a lot of sepoys and artillery. Haripant had 7-8 thousand sepoys and a good park of artillery. In this way, around three fourths of a lakh soldiers were with Haripant. In addition, Holkars and Beheres at Dharward and Savnur together had around 40,000 counting foot and horse. This number looks very large. But in this army, the number of sardars who had their heart in the campaign was few and had no unity of command. The level of command Haripant had on his own forces was far greater than he could control the Nizam’s forces or Bhonsles. The Nizam’s troops were as usual indisciplined and unruly.
Towards the end of May, after securing Badami, Haripant marched towards Gajendragad. After it was invested, two contingents of sepoys marching to reinforce it were caught out of position and destroyed by Marathas. With the Ghorpades as mediator, the killedar opened negotiations to surrender the fort. After 8 dyas of negotiations, it seemed like he will capitulate. Just then news arrived that Tipu has laid siege to Adoni. This was held by Nizam Ali’s brother Baslat Jung - this will be remembered by the reader as mentioned earlier. Baslat Jung had expired by now and his son MohbatJung was the commander along with his family. Tipu invested it and tried to capture it by assault. Despite this, Mohabat Jung repulsed two assaults. “If you do not reinforce us in time, we will be taken prisoner along with our family. To preserve the honour of our family, to prevent our wives and daughters from falling into the hands of Tipu, at least for this, reinforcements should be sent” - such a plea was received by Nizam Ali from Mohabat Jung. Nizam Ali immediately sent his younger brother Mogal Ali with 25,000 and rushed a letter to Haripant requesting him to combine with Mogal Ali and force Tipu to raise the siege. When he received this letter, Haripant left one third of his total force to continue the siege and sent the remainder towards Adoni on June 9. The main sardar of this army was Appa Balwant, and under his command were Bajipant Anna, Raghunathrao Nilkanth Patwardhan and the Mughal sardar TahavarJung and his subordinates. Combining with Mogal Ali arriving from Bhagnagar, they made haste for Adoni. As soon as they arrived in the vicinty, Tipu raised the siege and withdrew 3 kos. On June 22, (1786), Appa Balwant, Bajipant and Raghunathrao Patwardhan readied their force and advanced for battle. Tipu had left an advanced picket of 1000-1200 cavalry which was destroyed, and 100-150 horses captured. Tipu marched out at the head of sepoys and artillery, and opened a tremendous cannonade. In fighting that went on for several hours, Tipu was eventually forced back to his camp. Despite the intensity of the fighting, the 40-50 thousand Mughal troops sat idly in their camp. They did not reinforce or support the Maratha troops in any way.
Two days after Appa Balwant’s departure, Gajendragad capitulated to Haripant. Then he marched to join the rest of the army and halted at Kavtal Bhanu. Althought it was nearing the end of the campaigning season (due to monsoons and river flooding), he intended to cross the Tungabhadra, combine their armies and force a decisive battle with Tipu in his lands. This year, the rains had been delayed. For one or 2 more constellations, had there been no rain, his plan would have worked out well, and they would have been able to camp in the same place for 3-4 months. But the untimely bursting of heavy rainfall in the Adra(?) constellation, Haripant worried if he would have to abandon the idea of crossing the river and if his army would be stranded on the other side the entire season. In this game, Tipu had checkmated Haripant and waited to see how he will move. If he crosses over with his entire force, his camp and followers would be left behind, and it would not be possible to supply the large gathered force with grain and fodder. If he did not cross, could the stranded force hold on its own against Tipu? Nargund’s experience was fresh in his mind. Taking all this into consideration, he wrote to Appa Balwant “You should tell MohabatJung to take his family and exit the fort, cross the river while it is still fordable and come to this side.” Appa Balwant accordingly wrote to Mohabat Jung. But despite knowing the enemy will seize it, Mohabat Jung was unable to deplete the granaries, destroy the cannons before evacuating the fort. By the time he reached the river, it was already beginning to flood. Barely had the army finished crossing that the river flooded completely.
In this way, after extricating himself from Adoni, the two armies combined and made camp at Kanakgiri. After taking leave of Mogal Ali, taking along Tahavar Jung, Haripant marched to Bahadur Benda. By now, it was the end of July. As soon as the reinforcing army recrossed the Tungabhadra, Tipu’s flag flew on Adoni. Parshuram Bhau did not like Haripant’s decision to abandon Adoni. But we have seen above the difficult position Haripant was in.
After capturing Adoni, Tipu crossed over to the southern bank of the Tungabhadra with 50-60 thousand sepoys, 25 thousand cavalry, 150 cannons. When the Savnur Nawab heard of this, he was scared. He was married to Tipu’s sister. By this relation, they should have been close. But in practice they hated each other. As soon as Tipu crossed south, the nawab sent a messenger to Haripant saying he and his family would abandon the fort and join his army. But Haripant dissuaded him saying Tipu will not march with such a large force when the river is in flood. If he sends a smaller force, Behere has been deputed to defend you. If you leave Savnur, the entire province’s administration will panic and abandon their posts. This is why, you must stay. If you are short on manpower, we will send our sepoys and cavalry to Savnur. On receipt of this, the nawab got heart to stay. Ganeshpant Behere who had been posted to defend him, passed away after a short illness in the end of July. Command now fell to his nephew Mahadjipant.
Haripant believed Tipu would not be able to cross the river and attack in the monsoon, so of Dharwar subah and the Patwardhan lands, except for capturing the outpost of Dharwar, he remained idle, expecting to gradually seize the rest. We have already written earlier about him investing Bahadurbenda. After capturing it, he laid siege to Kopal. This fort was about to surrender, around the end of July, news arrived that Tipu had built a bridge of boats and forded the river along with his entire army north of the river to Galganath. Duff saheb did not know where is this place, and despite his search, he said he was unable to locate it. Nor is it located on any maps as per him. This place is called “Garghat” by him while Col Wilkis calls it “Karaknat”. Wilkis’ pronounciation is closer to the original than Duff. Considering that accessible points of a river must be named “Ghat”, how will Duff find it on the map? Galagnath is a famous place to cross the Tungabhadra in the Dharwar province, in the Haveri taluka.
Knowing that since the enemy has crossed over, he will try to march on Savnur first, Haripant left Raghunath Patwardhan with 10,000 at Kopal and marched towards Tipu with the rest of the army. At the junction of the rivers Tungabhadra and Vardha, Tipu had made camp at a place called Itanga. To his west was Vardha or Bala river and keeping a small rivulet to his front, he built trenches and artillery batteries of large siege cannons and fortified his position. His army was supplied with grain and fodder across the Tungabhadra from his lands and from west of Vardha river. Haripant in Lakshmi-eshwar Pargana, camped between Kapotgud and Banikop. From there, the enemy was 3 kos away. While marching from Kopal, Haripant sent away most of his camp followers to Ramdurg. He kept himself unemcumbered by any heavy baggage or large artillery.
( The following passage has been translated as it is written by Khare. It is not an accurate representation of how battles were fought between infantry and cavalry. But the author’s opinion is reproduced as it is.
Infantry relied entirely on firepower, firing volleys. They formed squares to guard against cavalry charges. Cavalry did not dash into infantry head on from the front. Cavalry ranks were thin, only 2 or 3. Massed firepower from 3 ranks of infantry could scatter even a frontal cavalry charge. Infantry was trained to form squares and hold their bayonets out to form a spear wall that would keep cavalry away.
Moreover, quite a few “cavalry” in the Marathi army carried firearms and rockets. Jezails and muskets were both common, and they were also capable of dismounting and fighting on foot just like regular musketeers. Rockets and artillery both dealt heavy damage to infantry squares, creating gaps which were then exploited by a cavalry charge. )
From here, the encounters between the two parties over the next 8 months needs to be elaborated. The battles that Marathas fought with Tipu or the English were greater than those fought with other enemies. The English and Tipu’s major strength was their sepoys and artillery. Maratha armies were primarily cavalry. In this campaign, 50-60 thousand cavalry was about to fight an equal number of infantry. This type of fighting means “Kakolukiya” (??) Type of fighting. The crow and owl are arch enemies but they never fight directly from the front. In the day, the crow can harass the owl, and the blinded owl has to find a safe place to survive. On the other hand, at night, its the crow who is blind and the owl has the upper hand. The way this fighting happens, the same way this battle was to happen. During the day, if the infantry decides to fight the cavalry, how could they force it? If the infantry advances 4 miles per hour, the cavalry can retreat 10. How will they catch them? And if by chance the encounter takes place on flat open ground, then once the cavalry charge hits the infantry, how will the infantry avoid being crushed by the cavalry? But this strength of the cavalry was only in daytime. Since they moved fast, they did not march with the artillery as securing the artillery used to need infantry and if slowed down by the weight of the cannons, they could not march fast. This is why, as mentioned earlier, the heavy cannons and other equipment was left behind at Ramdurg and Haripant had with him light cannons and camp to face the enemy. Most of the soldiers Haripant had with him were cavalry. Cavalry is inactive during the night, and in the darkness, Tipus sepoys used to watch for an opportunity to make surprise attacks.
Haripant and Mahadji both fought the English armies previously, but both of these great sardars had something unique in their armies which must be kept in mind. In the Gujarat campaign, Haripant would camp keeping a distance of 5 to 6 kos from the English camp. The intention was, if the English want to make a surprise attack on our camp at night, they should have to cover a great distance, thus giving time to prepare. From this, it is clear that he greatly feared being surprised by an attack at night. For Mahadji Shinde, it was not so. Even if he camped only 1 or 2 kos from the English, he had no fear. Not only that, many times, he marched to a very close distance to the English and made camp , and attacked with artillery and rockets at night, and looted their camp or animals. When he camped close to the English, with an advance notice of half or 3 fourths of a ghatika, his army was kept in a readiness to withdraw beyond the range of the attacker’s artillery and form up for battle. Despite this, one or two times the English were able to pull off a successful attack and cause some losses. In summary, his manner of fighting remained the same from the start to the end. The army under his command used to be entirely his own, so he had very good control over them. Haripant had been given command over a very disparate collection of armies, so he was unable to have such a close control over all of them. Considering this, overall, we feel there were more enterprising and courageous officers in Mahadji’s army than this army of Haripant. Even though the English considered Haripant the army chief, they depended more on Mahadji for treaties and feared him , such is our opinion.
This comparison of Haripant and Mahadji is before Mahadji trained new battalions with De Boigne, and only relevant to his battles with the English. Since he never fought Tipu, we cannot compare with Haripant directly. In the current campaign, Haripant was in enemy territory facing off with an enormous enemy. Whether this was appropriate or not had a split opinion even among sardars of the time. 22 years earlier, Madhavrao had intercepted Haider Ali in this same province, it was also for the protection of the Nawab of Savnur. If keeping that example in mind, Haripant advanced to Savnur, then he made two mistakes in my opinion. The first is Madhavrao did not make the mistake of engaging his enemy in the monsoon, and in doing so, Haripant put his army through much hardship. The second is that he did not make an analysis of the relative strengths of the two sides at this time in firepower. Madhavrao and Haripant’s armies were not identical. Even if we assume they were, there was a great difference between the strengths of Haider and Tipu. It is apparent to all that Tipu was much stronger than Haider. Haripant may have made a mistake in engaging his enemy during the monsoon. But once engaged, he proceeded with caution, courage and preserved his army, in this regard he deserves credit.
It has been written earlier, Haripant made camp at a distance of 3 kos from the enemy at Banikop. On 2 August, Bhonsles, Mughals, Haripant all detached a part of their army along with 10-20 cannons and advanced on the enemy. Then Tipu and the allies fought a battle of artillery, in which Bajipant Anna’s vanguard lost 10-20 horses and men. Haripant was hoping to bait Tipu into exiting his fortified position and advance, but he did not advance at all. A small detachment which went west intercepted a caravan of supplies and seized 300-400 bullocks and hundreds of carts. This detachment had forded the Vardha river. But the enemy’s army arrived and forced them to return. Staying near the enemy’s camp till evening, Haripant returned to camp. After this, he went to the enemy’s camp yet once more. The same story repeated again. All attempts of Marathas to dislodge Tipu from his fortifications failed to get any results. For around a month, he remained in his position. On the 2nd day of Ganesh Chaturthi, that is 28 August, Tipu left his camp with 10-15 thousand sepoys and artillery to make a surprise night attack on the Maratha camp. On this night, Visajipant Athavle with 4-5 thousand cavalry was posted ahead of the camp. He had experienced Tipu’s surprise attack once 9 years earlier. When Tipu’s artillery opened fire on his camp, they began a slow retreat while firing rockets at his sepoys. When messengers informed Haripant, he quickly readied the cavalry and advanced with a large force. Seeing this, Tipu began to retire. Other than injuring 10-15 men and animals, he had not inflicted any further loss. After 4-5 days, he tried one more surprise attack. But since the Marathas were prepared, he had to retire. After the halt at Banikop, letters were sent to Raghunathrao at Kopal and Tukoji Holkar at Hubali to leave their positions and join him. Raghunathrao raised the siege at Kopal and arrived swiftly. But since Burhanuddin was at Kalghati, Tukoji could not leave Hubali and join soon.
Tipu wanted to remain encamped at one spot. This is because his army had fewer cavalry and animals. In addition, his fodder used to be supplied over the Tungabhadra from his own provinces. But the Maratha army was mostly cavalry and they had a large number of animals in their camp. Finding adequate fodder for all of them was a great challenge. In a few halts, all grass within a 5-10 kos region would be depleted. Supplying it over the rivers was a challenge due the rivers flooding and at some outposts the enemy still had his soldiers. The Marathas wanted to lift Tipu’s checkmate on one hand but also could not remain in one place for too long. After a halt of 1.5 months at Banikop, due to the extreme scarcity of fodder, Haripant moved his camp on 12 September to Badani, which is around one kos from Lakshmeshwar. That same night early at dawn Tipu made another surprise attack. While the cannonfire was being exchanged, Haripant readided the cavalry and advanced. Since it was quite dark, Haripant fired at the enemy with cannons and muskets in the moonlight, as did the enemy. As sunlight dawned, Tipu returned to his camp and moved his camp to 4 kos from Savnur along the bank of the river Vardha. Next day he moved it another 1 kos to Hattimotur. So Haripant also moved his camp from Badani to within 1 kos from Savnur. The distance between the two sides was now 2 kos, and at the closest, only 0.75 kos. Due to this proximity, and the risk of a surprise attack, the Maratha cavalry used to sleep on their horses at night.
Burhanuddin was at Kalghati, and to face him were Tukoji Holkar and Behere at Hubali, even they had to keep scouts ahead of their camp and be vigilant. Their spies had managed to win over 500 Maratha cavalry in his army and 150 sepoys who joined them. But there were no skirmishes. In this situation, Tipu summoned Burhanuddin to join him, so Holkar and Behere also left Hubali to join Haripant. Despite the shortage of fodder, he could not abandon Savnur and march away.
Reports of the army’s situation would go to Pune every day. Tipu being engaged at such close quarters, the responsibility to face any surprise attacks fell squarely on Haripant. Parshuram Bhau remained idle at Tasgaon at home. Nana strongly wanted him to join the army. But since Bhau was resolved on not joining this campaign, he would respond with some excuse or the other. At one point he even asked that he would come to Pune to sort things out instead of leaving with his army to go south.
[exchange of letters between Nana and Bhau skipped]
Tipu had been unable to successfully attack the Maratha camp at night yet. Even so, he tried once more. Now Burhanuddin had just joined his army from Kalghat. After planning with him, on October 1 night, Tipu made another surprise attack. This has been described by Govind Sakhdev as follows
“ In the first prahar of the night, the enemy is getting ready- such news was received. So we posted scouts. After that 2 prahars elapsed, so we relaxed our watch. Just then, in the first prahar of dawn, the enemy arrived close to the picket in front of the huzurat and opened fire with 4-5 cannons. At the time, the men were sitting down and some of the horses ran to the main camp. At this picket, Rajashri Naropant Chakradev was posted. The enemy advanced in 2 groups. In one side, Tipu himself and Burhanuddin on the side where the government’s artillery was deployed. By the time he closed in, it was dawn. The cavalry held its position next to a mountain. When we opened fire with our artillery, they began replying back at us. Haripant himself was in the batteries and this firing continued for 1-1.5 prahars. Our cannons were few and of smaller bore, so we had to withdraw the cannons. Between the Huzurat, Holkars and Beheres, we lost 200 horses and some men. At 4 ghatikas in the evening the enemy retreated. Till then our armies stood where they were posted. Then keeping 20,000 in the vanguard, Rajashri Haripant moved to 1.5 kos to the north of Savnur. During the attack, some Pindaries from Holkars along with Bapu Holkar made their way to the rear of the enemy’s camp and recovered an elephant, some artillery carriages and 25 horses.
[ letter from Nilkanth repeating another description of the same fighting is skipped]
The Nawab of Savnur was already convinced that Tipu’s strength was greater than the Marathas this time. Tipu was now next to his capital, while Burhanuddin had also joined him. He had heard that Tipu wanted to seize him right within eyesight of the Maratha army and make him prisoner in his camp. As Haripant had repeatedly assured him that he will defend him, and that only by doing this would he preserve his ties with Pune that he had remained steadfast so far. This is also why Haripant had risked putting his army at great risk so far. But after the fights he observed so far, he lost heart and departed Savnur and joined Haripant’s army. Then Haripant did not have any particular reason to stay close to Savnur. Keeping some of his own and the nawab’s men for its defence, he marched to Kardagi in the Pargana of Halgur. He had planned to go to Saunshi, Kundgola.
Right since the time the Maratha forces laid siege to Badami onwards, Tipu’s envoy had been seeking negotiations. The contents of these negotiations is as described in a letter by Raghunath Nilkanth on September 25
[ letter is skipped]
For the defence of Savnur, Haripant had put his army at great risk, and this was apparent to all veterans. One such example is below
[example skipped]
Haripant knew all the constraints. But due to word of honour for Savnur’s defence, he was in a difficult situation. In the end it did not help.
When the Savnur Nawab left the fort, Haripant appointed his own men to defend the city. But when Tipu arrived, he threatened to put them to the sword and they surrendered without fighting. In the previous year, the Marathas had lost Nargund, and then Kittur. Even Adoni could not be defended. AS these events happened in rapid succession, the prestige of the state had dimmed in people’s mind. In such a situation, even despite having a force of over one lakh in the vicinity, Tipu’s capture of Savnur greatly raised his reputation.
“The enemy has great reknown. His artillery firepower is heavy. He has some 150 cannons, our tactics don’t work. After the Tungabhadra becomes fordable, whether his forces will retire or spread out we don’t know.”
This was the opinion shared by many important people in the Maratha army. But the difficulties faced by the Maratha armies were not all on account of Tipu’s achivements. This is because the terrain itself was such that it provided a great obstacle to the free mobility for Maratha cavalry. Staying in a defensible position, he was raiding the Maratha camp and inflicting casualties. With the intention of baiting him into advancing and surrounding and destroying his army, Haripant kept retreating ever so slowly to Sirhatti. This fort was in the hands of Tipu. But on November 14, the Marathas carried it by assault. They thought Tipu will leave his position to defend the fort. But since it was the month of Moharram, Tipu did not leave Savnur. In the meantime, seeing an opportunity to capture Dharwar, Holkars and Beheres had marched to it. But since they could not secure it by any means they returned empty handed. The Maratha army was now 8 kos from Savnur.
Around this time Tipu sent a vakil to the Nizam for negotiations as well as to Holkars. Tipu offered that if he is allowed to keep Nargund and Kittur, and returned to him any of his provinces which he held before the war, then he will pay some tribute, but this was unacceptable to Holkars.
After departing from Sirhatti, Haripant, just as before, marched to Kapatguda. His heavy baggage which he had left at Ramdurg was now brought to Kalkeri, which is 4 kos behind Kapatguda. Earlier, there used to be a dense forest in the valley between Kapatguda and Kalkeri. When he saw that the marathas have camped at Kapatguda, Tipu moved his camp on November 30 from Savnur to to the bank of the Vardha river to the north of Itga. This was 3 kos from the Maratha camp. Seeing the enemy this close, Haripant resolved to move back slightly to Kalkeri, and sent his baggage on the same day. He suggested the Mughals and Bhonsles to do the same. But the two declined and decided to keep their baggage with the army and neglected Haripant's arvice. This had consequences that embarassed them soon.
Tipu would get full information on all the movements of Maratha army. After attending to evening prayers, Haripant, Bhonsles and the Mughals were marching towards Kalkeri. In the valley on the route, while the camp followers were crossing, Tipu's cavalry fell upon them, unleashing a heavy barrage of rocket fire and began looting the equipment. A lot of civilians, grain merchants, pindaries were slain. Haripant's baggage, with the Zari Patka, artillery, naubat and colours were able to make it safely to Kalkeri but some horses were lost in several regiments. But otherwise he did not lose much. Bhonsles lost much of their baggage and the Mughals almost entirely. In this campaign, this was Tipu's last surprise attack on the Marathas.
Later, Haripant moved camp to Nirlagi in Gadag province. Right since before this raid, and even after, letters continued to arrive from Tipu saying he was sending a vakil to discuss terms, and that he wanted them to inform him when to send the envoy. From December, Tipu began to make overtures for peace. On December 7, a messenger came to Haripant and Rastes. In the letter to Rastes, he had written that "I am sending the vakil as agreed earlier. Please introduce the vakil to all sardars and escort him safely to Pune." To that, Raste replied "You have written about sending envoys, and then made a raid on our camp. If you want, send the envoy but there will be no meetings with any sardar. We will escort the vakil to Pune with some sepoys."
In the letter to Holkars, Tipu had written "I am sending a high ranking envoy. Discuss your demands and we will make an agreement acceptable to both." To this, Holkars replied "I am sending my envoy, when I get a reply about when it should be done - while such letters were coming, you raided our camp. This should not happen." Holkars' letter was aggressive. At this time and even after this, Holkars continued to be an intermediary with Tipu. In such times, making a raid on the camp while negotiations had begun had hurt the Holkars greatly.
When the enemy raid was underway, it was claimed Holkar's pindaries joined them and contributed to the disorder. It was indeed true. The day after the raid, many animals from the Bhonsles and Mughals were found with the pindaries with Holkar. It was rumoured that the Holkars were bribed by the enemy and thats why his men plundered the others. In addition rumours continued that stolen goods were sold by Holkar's pindaries at half price to Tipu's forces. But it was impossible that Tukoji Holkar, who had shouldered the responsibilities for so long and contributed thus would ever act in such a manner. Pindaries are after all plunderers. Even if their actions were such, it is unfair to blame it on Holkar. Holkars used to regularly receive papers from Tipu regarding negotiations. These were intercepted by others to check if there was any sign of betrayal. Such was never found. Haripant's reliance on Holkars to plan camp movements were disliked by others.
After this, the Marathi army began slowly moving eastwards along the bank of the rivers Tungabhadra and Vardha at a distance of 5-6 kos. Since Tipu always held his position on the stony and marshy banks of the rivers, it was impossible for the Marathas to attack him. Haripant tried to get him to leave his prepared position and advance on them. But Tipu was cautious and never took the bait. When the Marathas were at Jalihal, Tipu was near Kopal. After bombardment, he recaptured the fort of Bahadurbenda. Two or three times, a relief army was readied but Holkars did not allow sending it. Tipu kept sending letters saying he will raise the siege while negotiating and eventually took the fort. When the Maratha forces advanced, he would unleash a hail of cannonfire. But he never left his entrenchments and formed up for battle.
Even as negotiations were on and fighting halted, Tipu treacherously captured Bahadurbenda as described above. When camping in the Dambal pargana, Tipu's envoy arrived with an escort of 100 cavalry, 200 infantry, and 5-6 bodyguards. After meetings with Rastes and Haripant, negotiations began. At this time Tipu was still at Kopal. From there he marched to a distance of 3 kos from the Maratha camp to Bhundaragi pargana. Assuming he is preparing for yet another night attack, the Maratha army remained awake all night. As expected, on 18th December, he left his camp and advanced at night. But seeing that the enemy is alert, he retired. The next day, Haripant moved camp 7 kos to Kuknur, and Tipu retired to Kopal. Between these is a distance of 5-6 kos. Every day some cavalry would make their way close to Tipu's camp. Once Tipu's cavalry seized 80-90 horses from Beheres. At other times Marathas would seize from the enemy.
When Tukoji Holkar marched from Kittur to Hubali, he had left behind some 2-2500 cavalry near Sangoli. In this force, the brother of Shahji Bhonsle of Akkalkot- Bhavanji Patil and Baburao Anant of the paga were the main sardars. In this region, other than Dharwar and Kittur, no other province was left in the enemy's hands. All others were overrun by Marathas. Knowing that Holkars have an eye on Dharwar, and like the earlier attempt, they may plan to attack it again - since Tipu was convinced of this, even as negotiations were on, he sent 5000 to Dharwar to reinforce it and spoil the lands. This force arrived and invested Mishrikot. On receiving news of this, PAtil and Paga (Anant) kept their camp followers at Betgiri and marched to Hubali. As soon as they heard of this, the enemy raised the siege and hastily retired to Dharwar. Then letting their guard down, Patil and Paga stayed at Hubali for 4-5 days. While they were thus occupied, the enemy force made a surprise attack on their camp at Betgiri and plundered the area. Then these went to Betgiri, restored order and returned to Sangoli. The enemy was once again on the move! When confronted, they retreated again to Dharwar.
In January it was decided to end hostilities. But since Haripant did not trust Tipu, and he kept making excessive demands on each point, there was no understanding even by April. Finally in this month the talks finalized. It was decided that the arrears of tribute of 5 years amounting to 65 lakhs to Pune, would be cut to 48 lakhs. Of which, 32 lakhs would be paid immediately, and 16 lakhs over 6 months. In addition, Gagendragad, Badami, Nargund and Kittur would be returned to Marathas. Adoni would be returned to the Nizam. In addition, Savnur Nawab's province and fort captured would be returned to him. Nargund and Kittur's sardars kept prisoners were to be freed. For this to be sent to each other through envoys took another 15 days. Then Tipu departed back to Shrirangappatanam. After taking leave of all the sardars, the Nizam's forces joined in a large feast at Tasgaon before departing.
As we have written extensively so far, it must be apparent to the reader that Tipu's military was quite strong as well as his competence. Despite the combination of Marathas and Nizam, Tipu was able to capture Nargund, Kittur, Adoni and Savnur. For 6 months, harried them with surprise attacks. This is no mean feat. Not stopping there, he opened negotiations when his position was strong. which shows his keen awareness of diplomacy. As soon as the monsoon is over, he knew the Marathas would march to his rear and cut off his supplies - such was his great fear.