Battles of Tarain revisited
Much has been written about the two battles of Tarain already, especially since they were pivotal ones in hindsight. Fought between the Chahamanas and Ghurids, it led to Turkish incursions into the subcontinent after Ghurids won the second battle. All sorts of claims abound. Right from Ghurids defeating the Chahamana army 10 times their number, to the Gahadvala king secretly helping the Ghurids against the Chauhans. None of these claims stand up to scrutiny.
This essay attempts to consult source materials, compares claimed data with other antecedents and calculates estimates of the army sizes, compositions, the tactics and how the battles unfolded.
To start, we will examine the primary sources to reconstruct what the armies were like on each side. Next we will form estimates of relative army sizes. Finally, we will compare accounts of how the battle is said to have unfolded.
Ghurids
The Shansabanids were a Persianized dynasty which came to be known as Ghurids after their city of Ghur. They were originally Ghaznavid vassals, before successfully rebelling against them and overruning them entirely. By late 1000s, Ghaznavids had been vassalized by central Asian turks. The Ghurids drove Ghaznavids out of Afghanistan, eventually taking their last city Lahore in 1186 CE. A number of their battles and tactics have been described in Tabaqat-i-Nasiri by Minhaj.
To fight mounted archers, they constructed armour pieces which formed a shield wall.
The troops of Ghur have a method, in the practise of fighting on foot, of making a certain article of one fold of raw bullock-hide, over both sides of which they lay cotton, and over all draw figured coarse cotton cloth after the form of a screen [or breast-work], and the name of that article of defence is karwah. When the foot-soldiers of Ghur plade this [screen] upon their shoulders, they are completely covered from head to foot by it ; and, when they close their ranks, they appear like unto a wall, and no missile or arms can take any effect on it, on account of the quantity of cotton with which it is stuffed.
-Tabakat-i-Nasiri, Bibiliothetica Indica (1873), Page 352.
Against elephants, the infantry practiced drills to open gaps and let the elephant pass unimpeded before surrounding it. Elephants had been incorporated into Ghaznavid armies after their incursions into India. They were able to use them to great effect against their Central Asian enemies, who had little experience in fighting these beasts. By the time the Ghurids destroyed Ghaznavids, they acquired enough exposure to elephant tactics to design appropriate measures to counter it.
When the engagement was fairly begun, Daulat Shah, son of Bahram Shah, with a body of cavalry and an elephant, made a charge. Sultan Ala-ud-Din directed that the foot-soldiers should open their rank of karwahs, in order to allow Daulat Shah to enter with his whole division. They opened their ranks accordingly. When Daulat Shah, with his body of horse and the elephant, entered, the infantry closed the breach in their ranks again, and completely surrounded that Prince on all sides and he, with the whole of that body of horse, were martyred, and the elephant was brought to the ground, and also killed.
-Tabakat-i-Nasiri, Bibiliothetica Indica (1873), Page 352-353
Aside from elephants, Ghurid armies were fairly similar to Ghaznavid. We have some details of Ghaznavid armies during the time of Sultan Mahmud. The army under his personal command consisted of 15,000 horse and 10,000 infantry. Another army retained by his governor of Balkh commanded 12,000 horse and 10,000 foot. While the governor of Khwarazem had 20,000 horse and 10,000 foot. In total, ~47,000 horse and 30,000 foot. The army composition is 40% infantry, and 60% cavalry.
- The Ghaznavid & Seljuq Turks, G.E Tetley, Page 60
Chahamanas / Chauhans
We do not have explicit details of the army composition of the Chauhan army specifically, but we have multiple military texts from Classical India, specifying the ratios of different types of soldiers and their numbers. From the classical Indian text Nitisara, we get the following as functions of cavalry.
वनदिङ्मार्गप्रचयो वीवधासाररक्षणम् । अनुयानापसरणे शीघ्र कार्योपपादनम् ॥ ४ ॥
दीनानुसरणथैवः कोटीनां जघनस्य च । इत्यश्वकर्म पत्तेश्च सर्वदा शस्त्रधारणम् ॥ ५ ॥
The cavalry's role was not the shock combat role it would play in later times. But instead limited to scouting, messengers, protecting of supply routes from surprise attacks, and run down routing enemies. Mobility and surprise was important. This is a very different role than Mamluk heavy cavalry or European knights, whose primary role on the battlefield was to unleash a devastating charge with their lances.
From the book "The Army of Rajputs" by RX Saxena, as well as accounts of battles right up to Mughal times, we find that Rajput armies consisted of a large portion of infantry. The infantry fought with spears in close order formations. When pressed hard, they would at times, link their armour/cloth together to form an impenetrable wall. Often, cavalrymen would dismount when the fighting was severe. All of which points to the use of cavalry not for charges with lances, but in a supporting role and transport.
From the Gajapati military text "Harihara Chaturanga", we find that cavalry was posted for only two roles. To protect the king or crown prince, and as a reserve to exploit any gaps created or support a wing that is losing. This is also borne out by their strength, which did not exceed more than 10% of the total.
To conclude, we can estimate that cavalry did not play the same role in Chauhan armies as it did in Ghurid armies, nor did it constittue a significant portion of the army. This was not a handicap against enemy cavalry, as their spear wielding infantry was capable of warding off any enemy cavalry in tight formations.
Army size estimates
When reading army sizes claimed, it is a common feature to exaggerate enemy army sizes to vast numbers, to magnify the achievements of their patron king. Herodotus claims the army of Persians invading Greece amounted to 4 million. Caesar claimed the Gauls fielded millions of men. The claims from antiquity can be identified as false quite easily, due to the sheer magnitude of divergence from even modern day armies.
In case of Medieval writers, a different pattern emerges. One of the most well preserved memoirs is the Baburnama, written by the Mughal empire's founder. Babur was no stranger to war. He had fought his first battle before he turned 20, against the Uzbek king Shaybani. The forces on each side numbered no more than 3 to 5 thousand. In 1512, he allied with the Safavids against the Uzbeks. The Persian army that aided him was around 12,000. The Uzbeks fielded similar numbers. As late as 1525, the force that he marched with from Kabul for the conquest of Delhi, numbered only 12,000. But soon after Panipat, Babur receives a letter about a battle in the far north between the Uzbeks and Persians. Surprisingly, Babur notes the army size as 200,000 for the Uzbeks. The same Uzbeks who were unable to field even 20,000 few years prior, were somehow able to field 1000% more. Unless of course, the numbers are inflated to a great degree. Assuming the Uzbeks even bolstered their strength to a degree, 20,000 is possible. But 200,000 is not. Babur, who studied Alexander, older battles, ruled multiple cities at different times could not possibly believe that the Uzbeks actually numbered 200 thousand! The enemy army size is being inflated by a factor of 10. This is repeated, when he notes the size of his force marching from Kabul to fight the first battle of Panipat was 12,000. But 2 years later, even with a larger force, he claims to have beaten Rana Sanga's army of more than 200,000.
Leaving aside the logistical challenges and expense for such an undertaking, it is also physically impossible for an army to fight an open battle against another which is 3-10 times its size. Infantry deployed several ranks deep, typically in three wings. If both sides deployed equal strengths, the enemy would still be left with 70% of their army to spare. This enemy army could march to the flanks and attack from both sides and even the rear, while still having troops to spare! Of two armies, where terrain is a major impediment, such as a narrow pass, swamp, etc a major portion of the armies may not be able to engage. It becomes feasible for smaller armies to hold much larger ones at bay.
No such terrain features existed at Tarain. Minhaj claims an army of 120,000 cavalry for Ghurids based on what he was told by a government official, but 300,000 for the Chauhans. When contemporary writers like Minhaj mention army sizes, they often mention only the cavalry. We must add the estimated infantry to this total to get a rough estimate of the full army.
Assuming this to be an exaggeration of 10x as usual, it amounts to 12,000 cavalry. Adding infantry numbers calculated assuming the army to be similar to Ghaznavids, the lower bound of 40% infantry is ~8,000. In practice, the Ghurid attention devoted to anti mounted archer tactics makes it far more likely their infantry formed a much larger portion of the total, as opposed to a predominantly cavalry force that would have little trouble fighting mounted archers. If the infantry portion is higher, 50 or 60%, their infantry at Tarain II ranges between 12,000 to 18,000. This makes a total army strength of 20 thousand at the very least. 30 thousand as the higher end of the estimate.
The Chauhan army would be at most ~30,000 in the second battle, and 20,000 in the first . Roughly same as the Ghurids, or a little smaller, if the Ghurids fielded more infantry. Can we make any comparisons to evaluate if our estimates are within sensible ranges?
A comparison to Ghaznavids is useful as they were separated barely 100 years apart, and their territorial extent closely overlapped. Taking Ghaznavid numbers as accurate, their total strength was 47k cavalry, and 30k infantry. But this was for a kingdom extending from eastern Iran upto Punjab, defending against multiple enemy armies. The army that sultan Mahmud personally led was only 15k cavalry and 10k infantry. This aligns very closely with our calculated estimate of Ghurid army being 12k cavalry and 8-18k infantry, for a total of 20k to 30k!
In the first battle, Ferishta claims the Chauhans marched with a force of 200,000 horse and 3000 elephants. As we have seen above, the "200,000 horse" is more likely to be a force of 20,000 in total. But what about the elephants? After the second battle of Tarain and the capture of Delhi, the Ghurids took 14 elephants. After their victory over the Gahadvalas and conquest of much of their territory in 1194, they acquired 80. Comparing the number of elephants received in tribute over the next century, the numbers range from single digits, to at most 80-100. These high numbers are from the Eastern regions, which were famous for their dense forests and vast elephant herds. In light of this information, fielding 3000 elephants was out of question. Fielding even 300 was beyond possible. 30 is in the range of what was possible. From the discussion in the previous section on Chauhans, we estimated that cavalry formed no more than 10% of the total. Putting everything toegher, the army for Chauhans can be estimated to be 18-20 thousand infantry, upto 2000 cavalry, and 30-50 elephants.
First Battle of Tarain
According to Minhaj, in 1191, Mhd. of Ghor marched to Tabarhind and is said to have captured it shortly. He left 1200 men in garrison in the fort and departed back for Lahore. While he was enroute, he received news that the Chauhan army was close to the fort, and hurried back to fight it. This Chauhan army is said to have been 200,000. Adjusting it for exaggerations as detailed earlier, this was likely a force of 20,000. This was a 500km march from the capital Ajmer. At 15km per day of marching, this implies the Chauhans required at least a month of marching. It would take at least a month or more to put this force together. With a minimum interval of 2 months in the interim, the claim that the fort surrendered immediately is not plausible. A garrison of 1200 is also quite large for a Medieval fort. Capturing it must have taken multiple assaults.
Once it was garrisoned, the Ghurid army was on its way back but yet to reach Lahore when the Chauhan army arrived. The Ghurids retraced their path and faced off at the village of Tarain. We have no data on the Ghurid army size this time, but it was certainly smaller than the second battle, where we estimated the army size to be between 20 to 30 thousand. Against the Chauhan force of 20,000 , it was outnumbered.
As the three divisions engaged, left, right and center, the two wings were the first to be driven back. Retreating from the Chauhan onslaught, both wings began retreating towards the center. Their surplus numbers enabled Chauhans to flank the Ghurids on both wings. Without the room to maneuver and forced to fight elephants head on, the Chauhans crushed Ghurid cavalry as well as infantry. The Chauhans would have also noted the Ghurid technique of defending against archery, and its relative ineffectiveness against them. Ghurid heavy cavalry could be warded off by dense formations of spearmen. The Chauhans did not need to make any particular changes for fighting Ghurids, as long as they had sufficient numbers.
In a desperate attempt, the Ghurid sultan attempted to turn the battle by personally leading the attack on the enemy center. He was injured in the fighting and knocked off his horse. This broke Ghurid morale and the entire army turned tail. Even with their smaller army, the Ghurids had a much larger cavalry, at 40% vs the Chauhans 10%. This would make their retreat easier to execute, without any major casualties from being run down by the much smaller Chauhan cavalry.
After the battle, the Ghurid garrison still held out for almost a year before surrendering. Since it was recently garrisoned, their stocks must have been substantial, easing the pressure to surrender. The Chauhans probably did not want to take casualties when they could force a surrender by siege, and left the garrison on its own with a 13 month siege.
Second Battle of Tarain
Minhaj's Tabakat-i-Nasiri reports from a trustworthy source that the total Ghurid cavalry strength for this campaign amounted to 120,000. We've already calculated above, a more accurate description of the army is 12,000 cavalry, 10,000 to 18,000 infantry, for a total of 25 to 30 thousand.
The Taj-ul-Massir, by Hassan Nizami, who accompanied the Ghurids in this campaign, claims the Chauhan army to have been 300,000 in the second battle. Applying the same reduction, this makes it around 30,000. This time, there was an exchange of messengers, with the Chauhans asking the Ghurids to withdraw, showing a willingness to negotiate some territorial demands. The Ghurid commander replied that he did not have the authority to negotiate, and he will await a response from his brother, the sultan at their capital.
The Chauhans had already won the first battle, they knew Ghurid strengths. There were no negotiations before the first battle. This makes it more likely the Chauhans were aware of the much stronger Ghurid army than the previous year. By delaying battle, they could have called up more reinforcements, tipping the balance in their favour. The Chauhan caution is an indication there was likely no numerical superiority. Regardless, the Chauhans are said to have let down their guard, and suffered heavily from an attack on their camp during the night.
Considering the Chauhan strength to have been 20,000 by our estimates in the first battle, it is unlikely they were able to muster 10,000 extra troops. The number may have risen to a little higher, 22-25 thousand at best, by depleting some garrisons. From the events that followed the battle, the Chauhans remained strong in their southern provinces, so it is unlikely the strength that faced off at Tarain II was larger to any significant degree than the first battle.
The events of the battle are as follows.
The centre division of the army, the baggage, the standards and banners, his canopy of the state, and the elephants were left several miles in the rear. He marashalled his ranks, and was advancing leisurely. The lightly-armed and unincumbered horsemen he had dlirected should be divided into four divisions, and had appointed them to act against the infidels on four sides ; and the Sultan had commanded, saying "It is necessary that, on the right and left, and front and rear, 10,000 mounted archers should keep the infidel host in play ; and, when their elephants, horsemen, and foot advance to the attack, you are to face about and keep the distance of a horse’s course in front of them." The Musalman troops acted according to these instructions, and, having exhausted and wearied the unbelievers, Almighty God gave the victory to Islam, and the infidel host was overthrown.
-Tabakat-i-Nasiri, Bibiliothetica Indica (1873), Page 467-468.
The Ghurids learnt their lessons from the first battle. The Chauhan center was dangerous, engagement with it was to be avoided. The Ghurid center advanced much slower than their wings, staying behind and denying battle to the Chauhan center. But they had an extra secret weapon! 10,000 cavalry archers moved to the flanks and rear of the Chauhan infantry divisions and unleashed a storm of arrows upon them. Unable to withstand an attack from multiple sides, the Chauhan wings eventually broke, and with it, the center. As their army began their retreat, a large number were run down.
Archers require line of sight. The effectiveness of the Central Asian composite bow was greatest at distances of upto 100 meters against armoured soldiers. It was still dangerous at 200 or 300 meters, but only to the unarmoured troops. Archers, both mounted and dismounted required a clear shot, which meant they were deployed either on the flanks, or dead center. On the flanks, foot archers were vulnerable to being charged by enemy cavalry. In this case, not only were Ghurid archers able to keep their distance from Chauhan infantry due to their horses, but their own heavy cavalry superiority meant they could also defeat Chauhan cavalry on the flanks. Once the Chauhan cavalry was out of the picture, the Chauhan flanks of both wings were defenceless!
Alternatives
If the Chauhan infantry turned to face the archers on their flanks, they could have formed shield walls. But that left them exposed to a cavalry charge from the Ghurid cavalry, as well as the Ghurid infantry in their front. The Ghurid infantry and cavalry archers acted as a hammer and anvil. One held the enemy in place, while the other struck.
Could the Chauhans have driven off the Ghurid cavalry archers with their own foot archers? Ghurid cavalry remained a threat. Moreoever, there was little reason for the Chauhans to field any sizeable number of foot archers, given their ineffectiveness against Ghurid infantry they would have observed in the first battle.
Another option was to keep more soldiers in reserves. This would have required marshalling far more soldiers than was perhaps possible for them. It could be that this was exactly the plan, due to which the Chauhans agreed for negotiations. It would buy them time for more reinforcements to arrive.
Are there any similar battles in history? The battle of Carrhae (58BCE) comes close. 28,000 Roman infantry with 4000 cavalry faced a Persian army of ~10,000 made up of 9000 cavalry archers and 1000 heavy cavalry. In this case, the Persians fielded no infantry at all! The cavalry kept its distance from the Roman infantry formations. The Roman light cavalry of 4000 was no match for the Persian heavy cavalry. It was either destroyed or led away from the field. Without the support of their cavalry, the infantry had only two options. Either form shield walls to be protected from the arrows, or lower the spears to ward off the heavy cavalry. When they formed shield walls, they would get charged down by Persian heavy cavalry. If they tried to fight it, they would take severe casualties from the arrows. This was one of Rome's worst battlefield losses.
In the battles of the Crusaders from Europe against the Turkish states in the Middle East around the same time as Tarain, the Europeans found a technological solution to the problem of fighting cavalry archers. The crossbow. Unlike an archer, who required a long time and lots of gold to train, a crossbow could be used by a peasant trained for a few weeks. It required no strength on his part, only the ability to reload and aim. Crossbows could not keep up the same rate of fire as an expert archer, but kings could field a much larger number of crossbowmen than archers.
Conclusion
A comparative study of army sizes, army compositions, tactics goes a long way to reconstructing battles and military campaigns. Instead of a case of superhuman Ghurids defeating an army three times their size, it paints a far more believable case of Ghurid tactical innovation to beat an army of equal size.
Battles are won and lost all the time. A competent state learns quickly from its losses and adapts. Not all tactics can be beaten by the army at hand. Armies are a byproduct of the society that produces them. It isn't possible to make sweeping changes overnight. In the absence of superior cavalry, the options for Chauhans were to field a large number of foot archers, adopt crossbows, or choose the sites of their battles carefully. The Ghurids were not amateurs, they knew when to fight and when to avoid battles. Their generals were veterans, as were their troops. Had the Chauhan state lasted longer, it is quite possible they would have adapted to use cavalry archers, crossbows, or some other new tactics.
Ultimately, what did them in was not their battlefield loss, which is something every state faces once in a while. It was the breakdown of the mandala system of diplomacy. The loss of Chauhans and fall of Delhi necessitated a strong counterattack from neighbours, the Gahadvalas and Gujarat Chalukyas to restore the balance of power. The Chauhans may not have been able to beat the Ghurids with equal strength. But if another 10,000 were present on the field, they could crush the Ghurid center & wings or defend the flanks. These battlefield victories would have bought them time to make the necessary societal and technological changes.
While merchants, adventuers travelled from the Middle East to all over the world, writing memoirs of their travels, the strengths and weaknesses of other states, the Indian states made no such efforts. The Chauhans were seemingly unaware of the tactics of Ghurids, their army composition, nor did they have any diplomatic ties with the Ghurids' own enemies to their north and west. Indian merchants, mercenary soldiers with exposure to the battles of the Crusaders would have made the rulers well aware of the extents of their enemies, their technology, military tactics, etc. In hindsight, the lessons were learnt eventually, with the rise of Sisodiyas of Mewar and the Rathores of Marwar. Kānhaḍade Prabandha, written in 1455, does an excellent job of describing tactics and army compositions of late 13th century. But that is a story for another time.
Acknowledgements
@Sapratha on Twitter provided valuable data about number of elephants captured at various times from Medieval records and compositions of Ghaznavid armies.