Volume 1: Udgir campaign
The Udgir campaign lasted from late 1759 to early 1760, a year before Panipat. The commander of Ahmednagar, one of the key provinces of the Nizam fell out with him and offered to surrender the fort to the Marathas. The Marathas accepted, and the Nizam saw this as a breach of trust. Both sides mobilized for war. As neither side was particularly sure of the other's plan, smaller armies continued skirmishing, separated by miles. Eventually the armies combined near the fort of Udgir in January 1760, and a decisive battle was fought in mid-February. The Nizam, with around 50k, was defeated, and surrendered territory worth around 60 million Rupees, including surrendering 5 major forts which had been former capitals of the Deccan sultanates.
Prior to the Udgir campaign, is an account of the Battle of Sindkhed, from 1757. Although not part of this campaign, the original letter is included in the Peshwe Daftar Volumes. It is a long account and posted separately. This letter shows both sides using sepoys drilled in the European style, and Maratha cavalry was well aware of their tactics like forming squares.
No.1 - 29 December, 1757
Nana Purandare to Balwantrao Mehendale, describes the battle of Sindkhed, fought in December 1757 between the Nizam and the Peshwa's troops.
त्यास आम्हास फौजसुधा श्रीमंतानी घोडनदीवरून रवाना कार्तिक शुध येकादसीस केलें ते कार्तिक वद्य चतुर्थीस शहरोस दाखल जाहालो. तेच दिवसी मोगलाने शहर सोडून फौजसुधा कूच केले. बाबूराव फडणीस कारभारी होते त्याचे शरिरास ठीक नाही व बकसीगिरी ( गोवि ) दपंत तात्यास सांगितली. आपला धंदा राहिला नाहीं हा येक मनात राग येऊन उठोन श्रीमंताकडे गेले. आम्ही बहुताप्रकारें आग्रह केला ; परंतु मानले नाहीं. उठोन गेलेच तेव्हा श्रीमत् विश्वासँरायाजवळ चाकरी सारी करणे लागली.
The army dispatched by Shrimant on Karthik shuddha Ekadashi, have reached the city (Aurangabad) on Chaturthi. On the same day, the Mogul (Nizam) departed the city and marched with his army. Baburao Fadnis was the karbhari, and he was unwell. He informed Govindpant Tatya. Feeling disappointed that he will not be able to play any role in the upcoming battle, he withdrew back to Shrimant. We insisted that he should stay, but he did not listen to us. After his departure, Shrimant Vishwasrao was the commander here.
त्याच दिवसापासून मोगलाचे आमच्या फौजाचे जुंज सुरु जाहाले. संप्रदाये जुजाचा भोवताले उभे राहावे. केही मारावी , बंद करावी , पातल सापडल्यावर उठावे त्याप्रमाणे प्रत्यह होत असे. तोफा पाच सातदा लागू केल्या. मोगलाच्या फौजेवर मार बसविला. बाणहि टाकीत आसो.
We began a general skirmishing with the Mughal on the same day. Our scouts skirmished near their camp, and attempted to harass. We fired 5 to 7 volleys with our cannons. Along with these, we also let loose a barrage of rockets.
दोन तीन जुंजे उजबे बाजूस गोपालैराव , मल्हारराव , महिपतराव कवडे आनी आगाडीस बाजूस बरीच केली. मोगल सिंदखेडास जाऊन तेथे जाधवराव होते. आमच्या फौजा दतबार्कडील भोइटे , वाबले , व हुजरातचे आटोले , बोरगे हे सिदखेडा भोवते महिनाभर होतेच. जाधवरायास उखलू दिल्हे नवतेच. यासाठी वलीआहद फौजसुधा जाधवरायाचे कुमक करून आणावयासी निघोन सेवटी सिदखेडास येऊन जाधवराव मिलऊन घेतले.
Both fell squarely in his massed army. There were 2 or 3 skirmishes on the wings. Gopalrao Patwardhan was in the right wing. Malharrao Raste in the center, and Mahipatrao Kavde in the left wing. ( This marks the end of action for the day).The Mogul had marched to Sindkhed to relieve Jadhavrao. Dattaji Shinde’s Bhoite, Wable, and the Huzurat’s Atole Borge had already reached Sindhkhed since a month. They chased Jadhavrao’s forces into the fort here at Sindkhed. ( some background). To reinforce him, the Nizam marched to Sindkhed and joined forces.
The next day, the Nizam moved his camp a little further behind. It was the Margashirsha Shuddha Pratipada. We found a suitable spot to set up an artillery battery and cannonaded his assembled force. Unable to withstand the fire, they abandoned their artillery and retrated further beyond.
To our right was Dattaji Shinde, and to our left were some hills. This was an excellent spot and we set up our cannons there. By getting the extra height, we were able to hit their army again. Unable to retaliate with his artillery, the Nizam ordered his infantry to march out and silence our artillery. Ibrahim Khan Gardi formed his men and they marched in formation under a hail of our fire. As they get close, we retired our field pieces and formed a line to meet them. As the guns had been posted in a strong position, they deployed the bulk of their forces in their left wing, away from our line of fire.
Dattaji’s men were the first to be engaged. Gardis in the front, and Nimbalkar’s men in a second line behind. Their line marched in order to their music and engaged us at close range. Our men stood in close ranks and fought back equally hard- firing their jezails and muskets. They tried to break us with cavalry several times, but could not get close. The firing continued in this way for almost 80 minutes. As both sides were very close, the shots took a heavy toll. Dattaji’s men eventually advanced into melee, and attacked at close range. The Nizam's infantry repulsed this twice, but the third time, they broke and retreated.
About 300 men were lost, as well as horses. More are wounded. And thus the battle ended. At 5pm, the Nizam sent an envoy with a peace offer. It took around 2 weeks to finally settle the negotiations. The Nizam signed away 25 lakhs of territory. He also specified the specific Parganas. We also took Naldurg fort. After the treaty was signed, a meeting was fixed for 17 Margashirsha Chaturthi. Similar to the meeting at Bhalki (after the battle), Shrimant Vishwasrao met the Nizam. We made arrangements as were appropriate. Nimbalkar and Shah nawaz Khan were not present. Vithal Sundar, the Nizam’s diwan, and Bajad Ali khan were present. This was Vishwasrao’s first battle, he did well and a great victory. I have written so that you may be kept informed.
Regards, Govindpant
No.5 - 7 November, 1759
The letter describes the state of the armies before the battle- and a skirmish and night attack before the battle.
Following the Swami's instructions, we shadowed the Nizam's army on its right flank closely. Some infantry and karols (dragoons) skirmished with his army as it was marching. We were able to injure a few higher ranking officers. As they slowed down, we also fired 7 volleys on them with some light field pieces. The cannonballs found their mark. We also fired some 25- 30 rockets. 2 or 3 missed, but the rest hit right the middle of his army. In the fire returned by their artillery, Sheikh Gardi ( Ibrahim Khan Gardi) lost 2 men. By now it was evening. At night, we sent some pickets to take a few field pieces and rockets close to the Nizam's camp at night. As night fell, we started firing the cannons and rockets again. Unfortunately, some groups lost their way in the night, and we could not press our advantage. The skirmishers too are unable to do any harassment to his baggage. The Mogul has posted his army and fortified his camp around a distance of 3 kos. However they are posted further ahead of our army, and can screen well. To my side are Gopalrao (Patwardhan), Raste, and Kavde in 3 groups.
No.10 - 16 December, 1759
Sadashivrao writes about various matters regarding the campaign, his health and logistics.
Janoji Bhonsle has few men. Mudhoji has far more, and is marching against him. There will be a battle soon. Please instruct regarding the course of action to take in this matter.
The artillery is understaffed, and is running low on gunpowder. Please instruct Govindpant to look into this. New men should also be hired quickly. We require 3 lakh Rupees for bills. Another 2 lakhs for the khas paga (huzurat). We have 1.5 lakh at present. It got spent on some equipment, nalbandi ( advance pay for troops at the start of the campaign) and gardi salaries. Other miscellaneous expenses amounted to 50k. We had to borrow some from Paithan for the shortfall.
I would prefer the appointment of Havaldar Ranojirao Khanvilkar. We have found a good spot to set up camp. The Swami (addressee) is requested to take care of his health well, and rest for a month. Please dispatch Annaji Satham to us as well.
I have collected 6k men here. Another 1k will be here soon. There are another 500 infantry in nearby garrisons. I've sent letters summoning them here. The huzurat is requested to mobilize and dispatch 2k to me immediately. It will be difficult to fight with with fewer men. There are another 2k infantry near Aurangabad. If I had 20k men at my disposal in total, this campaign would have been much easier.
I am recovering well, I eat once every 2 days, but not a heavy meal. The medicine continues as usual. The wound has not healed yet, and there is still weakness. Because the injury is in the back, dand and (surya) namaskars cannot be done much. I could do a few, and felt happy to resume it.
(There was an assassination attempt on Sadashivrao Bhau's life, which he survived, but left a deep wound in his back.)
Babuji Naik, Vithalpant etc have not yet assembled their forces. I expect they will arrive together. Fodder is scarce, and we have to march much further between halts.
No.19 - 11 January, 1760
Vithal Shivdeo writes about a skirmish
As ordered by the Swami, we are 2 kos from the Mughal. We are awaiting your arrival. We have posted sentries on both flanks. Today the Mughal was 2 kos from Udgir. Jadhavrao has also reached yesterday. We sent some skirmishers who acquired some pack animals and tents from the Nizam. The terrain was difficult, and no path for our armies to deploy and engage. We continued firing at range. It appears the Mughal's army is 10-15k. Gardi is marching with 8-10k infantry and cannons. When he arrives, I will dispatch a letter.
No. 20 - 12 January, 1760
Vithal Shivdeo describes a fight
Yesterday I wrote that the Nizam's camp is 2 kos from Udgir. Jadhavrao's camp is at Udgir. Today morning, we marched out and formed up for battle. We fired some cannons at the fort. To our right was Jadhavrao, at Udgir. Due to the mountainous terrain, neither could close in for battle. We harassed the Nizam's camp again and seized 30-40 carts and even a few guns, and felled a few tents. The Nizam's infantry started forming up. We withdrew our infantry and brought karols (dragoons). After some long range skirmishing, we withdrew to camp. The Nizam has about 10k cavalry, and another 10k line infantry, camp followers, and the artillery.
No.24 - January 13, 1760
Raghunathrao recommends a strong frontal attack, and discourages skirmishes and night attacks.
Night attacks do not do us any good. This is done by weak armies. Our strength is our army. Please ask Ibrahimkhan for his view as well. My view is that we should boldly seek a general engagement of our armies. Firing cannons and rockets from afar won't do anything. Even if the Mughal marches off, I strongly suggest intercepting his army and forcing a pitched battle. If the terrain was not unsuitable, it would have been easier to do night attacks. Please advise your thoughts on this matter.
No.25 - 16 January 1760
Antaji Mankeshwar describes a closely fought cavalry action with the enemy.
Ibrahim Khan's men were charged by the enemy cavalry. We sent our cavalry to intercept them, and engaged Jadhavrao's cavalry. We fought for one ghatika. A general melee ensued. There were about 1500 of them. Among us, I had 200, Satvoji Gavde had 200, Rayaji Pawar 25. Ramaji Pant, my nephew, and Lakshmanpant from the paga were the first to swing their swords. It was a brutal fight - sword against sword. We cut about a 100 of their men. I lost 4 men, and Gavde also lost 5, as well as some horses, and 40 wounded. It was a close call. Ramaji Pant is severely wounded, and may not make it. Jadhavrao is now here with his army. We will await the Shrimant before departing. By our actions, we saved almost 5000 troops. Babuji naik was in the right wing, but did not leave his position. Please reinforce me with a 1000 fresh cavalry, and a total command of 5000.
No.26 - 16 January 1760
Raghunathrao asks for more artillery.
The elephant Hiragaj has reached. We will put him to good use. I will also require the 2 mahouts. Please send the other elephant as well- we will need both. We'll send back the elephant Shamsher instead. We will need to keep the cannon Laxmi. The others are of small caliber. This is the only useful cannon at long ranges. Of our 8 large cannons, please 1 or 2 more. This is my request, please advise as necessary.
No.27 - 16 January 1760
Raghunathrao asks about artillery deployment
As ordered, we've started cannonading from the dawn. However we have only one siege cannon, the rest are small. Do you want me to use only the large cannon from afar? Or should we push closer with the smaller field pieces? Please advise.
No.35 - January (unknown date), 1760
Sadashivrao writes some updates about his position.
We have stayed at the same place that we set up the artillery batteries. To our right is Chiranjeev dada. Yashwantrao Pawar is in charge of batteries, we are a little behind it. To dada's right is your camp. But you have few men. Most of the men are concentrated near my position- and has become lopsided. Your flank is exposed, please redeploy some men from my positions to yours to cover it. Please send 200 cavalry to a forward position on your flank to guard it. The banjaras (grain merchants) have arrived and stayed at the camp today.
No.36 - 19 January, 1760
Raghunathrao discusses battle plans.
The Swami's note has been received. News about the Mogul's camp was also received. We fired the cannons heavily yesterday. He took heavy damage yesterday, and he has resolved to charge out if we deploy our cannons again - such is the spy's report. However, if they break, we should send our cavalry in for a charge. However, we don't have enough good men for it. The Swami should keep a close eye, and if they break here, he should advance with his full force. I have summoned Bapuji Naik to my position. After his forces join us, we will engage and let God decide the outcome. We dispatched Darkoji Nimbalkar and Satvoji Gavde to Swami, I hope they have reached. Bapuji Naik should be ready to charge, and keep a close eye on us in case we get attacked. Please inform him so.
Mainly, the Mogul has panicked because of our artillery bombardment. He has decided to charge us whenever he finds an opportunity. In doing so, it is an excellent opportunity for your artillery. But we shouldn't restrict ourselves to just artillery action. In case the Mogul charges you, we will march out with our infantry. Similarly, we request you to march out your infantry if we are attacked. God is on our side. The Swami should inform us of his thoughts. Together with Ibrahim khan, we should decide on a final battle plan within a day or 2. Alternately, we can await the forces of Damaji, Samsher Bahadur, Huzurat, Mane, Nimbalkar and then engage.
No.37 - 19 January, 1760
Raghunathrao provides an update about artillery exchange with the enemy.
I am writing as our cannons are not working. After we fired our artillery, he sent some 5k infantry to seize the guns. We withdrew the guns and stood ready to receive his advance. Consequently, he bombarded us as well with his artillery. But we anticipated his actions and took cover. While we did not take severe casualties, we were forced to withdraw. There is no water for 5 kos. His artillery fire is heavy, so we are unable to take the offensive. We are awaiting further orders.
No.39 - 20 January, 1760
Raghunathrao writes about artillery action again to Balwantrao Mehendale.
We had a severe artillery exchange yesterday. Some of our gunners are injured. You must have received my update. We are awaiting new cannons from you, which are yet to arrive. The Peshwa has ordered Rajashri Damaji to be sent here. Dharmaji Gopal, the clerk has been sent to you. Please ensure the cannons and Damaji reach us today. If you are also short on artillery, please send us only one. If you can spare 2, it will be excellent. Our firing was fairly effective yesterday.
No.42 - 23 January, 1760
Raghunathrao describes an engagement with the enemy.
As ordered, the artillery firing from us was very effective. We fired 30 to 40 volleys. The cannon Laxmi was very effective. The elephant Chandoli was injured in the firing. The Swami must have received the news- the Mogul has camped early today, though we don't know his intentions. We will know today's casualties by the Moguls when the spies arrive. Vithal Shivdeo also skirmished a lot today. Please inform us of his actions.
No.51 - 31 January, 1760
Raghunathrao asks for final plan for attack, and advance notice so he can coordinate his attack.
If the final battle with the Mogul has been planned for a particular date and time, please inform us of the same. I have been ordered to keep 2 siege cannons with me. For this, Gangadhar Parshuram and his men, as well as his gardis (line infantry) and 2 cannons have been retained by me. The surplus cannons, infantry with Mahipatrao and Trayambak Khanderao will be dispatched to you. If required, even Gangadhar's men and cannons can be dispatched. Please write to us as you decide.
When the final plan is prepared, we must know in advance by one day. It will take us 4 ghatikas to engage. At night, I suggest unsettling the Mughal by sending some rocketeers for skirmishing, as well as some karols (dragoons) to snipe his sentries.
No.52 - January 26, 1760
Raghunathrao writes about movements of the enemy.
Please inform us of the movements of Basalat Jung. If we can locate him, send your entire force to destroy his force before he can make junction with the Nizam. If they combine, their force will be very strong. Where are Nimbalkar and Khandagale? The Swami is well informed, but I have written anyway.
No.55 - January 29, 1760
Your letter has been recevied. As ordered, we have marched. But our men are fewer. Part of my pathaks (groups) have been sent to Shankarji Ghorpade, Damaji Gaekwad, Rayaji Pawar. Please write to them urgently to join with us. Babuji Naik should also be sent to us.
When we deploy, we should have empty space in the rear of our right, and not deploy a second line. When the center retreats, it should have a clear field. On the right wing, we will post Damaji and Naik. We will cannonade and charge the Mughal's left wing and then retreat. This is our plan.
All the cannons and gardis will be posted on the right. Babuji Naik thinks Nizam Ali's will to fight will break after a pitched battle, but not without it. If we are to have a pitched battle, it should not be on Trayodashi- it is an ill fated day for both of us.
No.59 - 30 January, 1760
Raghunathrao writes about the battle order and plan.
Swami's update about the engagements has been received. Nanasaheb's letters have also been received. If we don't fight a pitched battle, it will demoralize the men. Any time is a good time, but Thursday and Friday are especially suited.
Our artillery is concentrated at the center, and the Swami's forces are on the left wing. We will engage the Nizam's left wing from the right. Behind us are Damaji and Malhar Naik. Babuji Naik is to our right rear in reserve.
I have written to request sending Damaji, Shankarji and Rayaji but have not received a response. Please do not delay. Without them we have few men. The Swami has Patankar and Ghatge, but my men are not present. The Swami may do as he pleases, I will not insist. All that matters is the job gets done.
I am doing all I can- ultimately God gives the fruits of our effort. The Swami's fortune is great. Today the Nizam has halted. Possibly because he received some forces from Salabutjung.
No.60 - February 1, 1760
Raghunathrao writing an update.
We stayed very far from the Moghul yesterday. There is no water nearby, so we have to stay further away. From 5 ghatikas in the morning to 10 ghatikas is an astrologically opportune time for attack. From 10 to 15 is the best.
Start the artillery fire as usual. When they have taken enough fire, they will march to us. When they do, engage on both sides. Trimbak Khanderao and Mahipatrao will meet their advance. We will make a detour and fall on the Mughal's left flank at 10 ghatikas. Damaji and Gaekwad are to our right in reserve. If we are hindered by the terrain, we will still start the cannonade. When the enemy closes is, we will feign a retreat, and beat them with the combined forces of the reserves and the wing.
No.62 - 1 February, 1760
Before the Moghul deploys his army, identify the killing zone, and set up the cannons appropriately. While deploying, be careful of charging with cavalry. The terrain is unsuitable. There is a dried riverbed in the center which offers very good obstacles for the enemy. That is the ideal place to deploy the artillery with the most frontage.
No.72 - February 1760
Sadashivrao writes to someone.
We have halted at Kalegaon. The Mughal is 3 kos from here. How far are you from the Mughal? And where? Write to us about it. It is time to concentrate all forces for a pitched battle. Rajashri Tukoji Shinde has arrived. Sakharam Pant fell today. My sincere condolences. We will be on the field in the morning.
No.79 - 3 February, 1760
Moraji Shinde writes about the main battle from Rajpuri to the Peshwa.
As ordered, on Tuesday, we deployed and unleashed the entire artillery on the Mughal army. They were not yet ready, and the artillery fire wrecked havoc in their camp. Some shots even felled some tents, and hit his animals and camp, creating chaos. His men took down most of his tents and moved further beyond our range.
When his artillery was silenced, his infantry formed up. Ibrahim Khan and sarkar's gardis formed two parallel lines and marched towards the Mughal. They closed in and engaged in a massive firefight. We lost around 250 - 300 men, and 5 to 7 officers, with many more wounded. Among sarkar's gardis, another 200-300 were killed. The Nizam's casualties are unknown, but higher. This close firefight broke his line, and they routed. (Due to terrain, the cavalry could not chase them down.).
The Nizam's men have taken refuge at the Udgir fort. We have laid siege to it, and cut off his food and water. By lord's good fortune, the enemy will be utterly defeated.
No.83 - 11 February 1760
Sadashivrao writes to the Peshwa of the terms offered to the Nizam.
The Nizam has signed away the fort of Daulatabad, and we have taken posession of the orders for handing it over to us. We are sending this letter to you. Send someone good at negotiations like Gopalrao Patwardhan with this to take posession of the fort. The Nizam is in dire straits. He has promised territory worth 45 lakhs ( 4.5 million Rupees). I have demanded 45 net of chauthai ( Sadashivrao wants territory worth 45 lakhs excluding the 25% they already get. Thus, a demand of 60 lakhs). The Nizam has agreed. We have demanded such a sum because of Vithal Sundar instigating the Nizam against us. Vithal Sunder has also offered submission and tendered his apology.
I will send the sanads for the killedari of Daulatabad later. We have already appointed officials for it. Do not appoint anyone else. In total, we defeated an army of 50k of the Nizam. Sanads of Bijapur have also been dispatched. Baslat Jung is about to vacate the place. Of the total 60 lakhs, 10 will be paid upfront, perhaps 15. I will write the final details when it is settled.